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Abstract	  International	   development	   agencies	   are	   increasingly	   looking	   to	   business	   as	   a	  partner	  in	  achieving	  development	  outcomes.	  	  Engaging	  business	  in	  development	  has	   become	   a	   central	   plank	   of	   many	   countries’	   aid	   policies.	   	   However,	   the	  potential	   of	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   development	   is	   still	   largely	  unrealised.	   	   Business	   and	   development	   agencies	   would	   benefit	   from	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  what	   forms	  of	  practical	  partnership	  might	  be	  constructed,	   for	  what	  purposes	  and	  with	  what	   likely	   impact.	   	  We	  propose	  a	  new	  framework	  for	  thinking	   about	   practical	   engagement	   between	   business	   and	   development	  agencies.	  	  It	  is	  based,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  partnerships	  that	   increase	   the	   development	   impact	   of	   core	   business	   activity,	   and	   those	   that	  contribute	   to	   the	  private	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.	   	  Within	   this	   framework	  we	  discuss	   development	   agencies’	   existing	   involvement	   in	   inclusive	   business	  ventures,	   pro-­‐poor	   supply	   chain	   initiatives	   for	   internationally-­‐traded	   products,	  public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   service	   delivery,	   and	   product	   development	  partnerships	  in	  health.	  	  In	  each	  of	  these	  four	  areas	  we	  provide	  short	  case	  studies	  and	   identify	   a	   set	   of	   issues	   for	   further	   consideration	   in	   future	  work.	   	  We	   close	  with	  some	  observations	  on	  cross-­‐cutting	  issues,	  including	  the	  slenderness	  of	  the	  evidence	   base	   in	   this	   field,	   and	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   existing	   initiatives.	   	   Our	  main	   conclusions	   are	   three.	   	   First,	   the	   next	   generation	   of	   enterprise	   challenge	  funds	  should	  be	  designed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  broad	  evaluation	  of	  their	  predecessors	  and	   explicit	   consideration	   of	   a	   set	   of	   issues	   that	   we	   identify.	   	   Second,	   	   more	  effective	  brokerage	  arrangements,	  and	  some	  flagships,	  will	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  service	  delivery.	  	  Third,	  a	  comprehensive	  review	   of	   product	   development	   partnerships	   should	   be	   undertaken	   which,	  among	  other	  things,	  compares	  them	  to	  market-­‐based	  alternatives.	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When	  business	  meets	  aid:	  	  analysing	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  	  
international	  development1	  
1.	  	  Introduction	  
Business	   has	   long	   been	   viewed	   by	   international	   development	   agencies	   as	   a	   potential	  partner	  in	  achieving	  development	  outcomes,	  though	  interest	  in	  the	  subject	  tends	  to	  wax	  and	  wane.	  	  Most	  recently,	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  development	  was	  discussed	  extensively	  in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	   Fourth	  High-­‐Level	   Forum	  on	  Aid	   Effectiveness	   (HLF4)	   in	   Busan,	  Korea,	   in	   December	   2011.2	   	   Actual	   partnerships	   between	   development	   agencies	   and	  business,	  which	  we	  shall	  refer	  to	  as	  “public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  development”,	  are	  still	   rare.	   	   The	   Australian	   Government’s	   Independent	   Review	   of	   Aid	   Effectiveness	  recommended	  in	  April	  2011	  that	   the	  Australian	  Agency	  for	   International	  Development	  (AusAID)	   set	   up	   mechanisms	   to	   work	   more	   closely	   with	   Australian	   business	   in	  developing	   countries.	   	   In	   response,	   the	   Government	   established	   a	   high-­‐level	   Business	  Engagement	  Steering	  Committee,	  held	  a	  Consultative	  Forum	  with	  Business	  in	  Canberra	  on	   21	  August	   2012	   and,	   at	   this	   event,	   released	   a	   new	   private	   sector	   development	  strategy	  for	  Australia’s	  aid	  program	  that,	  among	  other	  things,	  commits	  AusAID	  to	  engage	  more	   fully	   with	   the	   business	   community	   in	   Australia	   and	   in	   developing	   countries.	  	  AusAID	   also	   commissioned	   the	   Business	   in	   Development	   Study	   2012	   from	   Accenture	  Development	  Partnerships	  and	  Business	  for	  Millennium	  Development	  as	  a	  first	  survey	  of	  Australian	  business	  engagement	  in	  international	  development.	  	  	  
                                                




At	  present,	  little	  Australian	  aid	  is	  provided	  in	  support	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  development3—though	   this	   might	   be	   expected	   to	   change	   as	   the	   Government’s	  commitment	   to	   engage	  more	   fully	  with	   the	   business	   community	   is	   implemented	   over	  time.	  	  There	  is	  as	  yet	  no	  comprehensive	  policy	  framework	  for	  business	  engagement;	  nor	  is	  there	  any	  explicit	  set	  of	  principles	  to	  guide	  decisions	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  aid	  funds	  to	  business	  partnerships.	  	  These	  latter	  points	  apply	  equally	  to	  other	  bilateral	  donors,	  even	  including	  donors	  that	  are	  quite	  active	  in	  a	  funding	  sense,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK).	  	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  information	  on	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	   is	  both	  general	  and	  partial;	   there	   is	  nothing	  resembling	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  development	  agencies’	  partnerships	  with	  business.	  	  	  Some	  donors	  claim	  to	  be	  well	  along	  the	  road	  in	  forming	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  development,	  though	  specific	  information	  on	  the	  objectives,	  working	  arrangements	  and	  achievements	  of	  individual	  partnerships	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  find.	  	  The	  US,	  in	  particular,	  has	  formed	  a	  series	  of	  “Global	  Development	  Alliances”	  with	  corporate	  actors	  since	  2001,	  and	  says	   it	   has	   leveraged	   nearly	   $US19	  billion	   in	   combined	   public	   and	   private	   resources	  through	   more	   than	   1,600	   alliances	   with	   over	   3,000	   distinct	   partners.4	   	   Partners	   are	  expected	   to	   share	   costs	   and/or	   risks,	   and	   not	   merely	   to	   play	   a	   fully-­‐compensated	  program	   implementation	   role.	   	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   the	   G8	   launched	   at	   its	   Camp	   David	  summit	   in	   2012	   the	   New	   Alliance	   for	   Food	   Security	   and	   Nutrition,	   which	   gives	  prominence	   to	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   and	   claims	   that	   “first-­‐wave	   private	   sector	  investment	  pledges	  across	  the	  agricultural	  value	  chain,	  including	  irrigation,	  processing,	  trading,	   financing	   and	   infrastructure,	   already	   stand	   at	   over	   $US3	  billion	   and	   could	  potentially	  impact	  millions	  of	  smallholders”	  (USAID	  2012,	  p.	  1).	  	  	  
                                                




The	  UK,	   also,	   has	   sharply	   increased	   its	   engagement	   in	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	  development,	   though	   with	   a	   more	   recent	   starting	   point	   than	   the	   US	   (early	   2011),	   a	  somewhat	   stronger	   emphasis	   on	   partnerships	   that	   promote	   local	   private	   sector	  development,	  and	  a	  more	  explicit	  insistence	  that	  it	  is	  not	  seeking	  to	  promote	  commercial	  opportunities	  for	  UK	  firms.5	   	  The	  scale	  of	  this	  engagement	  is	  so	  far	  difficult	  to	  perceive	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  UK	  Department	   for	  International	  Development’s	  (DFID)	  own	  public	  information	  sources.	  	  As	  for	  other	  European	  donors,	  we	  know	  that	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  or	   so,	   Germany	   is	   said	   to	   have	   initiated	  more	   than	   3,000	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	  with	  a	  value	  in	  excess	  of	  €1.4	  billion,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  75	  much	  larger	  partnerships	  with	  a	  value	  of	  around	  €2.2	  billion	  (Conley	  and	  Dukkipati	  2012,	  p.	  3).	  In	  pursuing	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  with	  multinational	  corporations,	  as	  opposed	  to	  local	   companies,	   it	   appears	   that	   donors	   tend	   somewhat	   to	   favour	   corporations	  headquartered	  in,	  or	   identified	  with,	   their	  own	  countries.	   	  For	  example,	   the	  US	  Agency	  for	   International	   Development’s	   (USAID)	   most	   prominent	   corporate	   partners	   include	  Apple,	   Motorola,	   Ford,	   Microsoft,	   Intel	   and	   Cisco—though	   it	   also	   works	   with	   non-­‐US	  companies	   such	   as	   Ferrero	  Rocher,	   in	  Georgia,	   and	  Asiacell,	   in	   Iraq	   (Shah	  2013,	   p.	   6).	  	  DFID’s	  partners	  include	  UK	  companies	  Diageo	  and	  SABMiller,	  but	  also	  many	  foreign	  and	  local	   firms.	   	   Giving	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   companies	   in	   one’s	   own	   vicinity	   is	  defensible	   on	   efficiency	   grounds,	   particularly	   as	   more	   donors	   step	   up	   business	  engagement	   in	   their	   jurisdictions,	  but	   can	  give	   rise	   to	  a	  perception	   that	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  are	  vehicles	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  donor	  countries’	  own	  international	  trade	  and	  investment	  promotion	  agendas.	  	  It	  does	  not	  help	  that,	  as	  noted	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	  some	  donors’	  private	  sector	  “linkages”	  programs	  are	  in	  fact	  precisely	  that.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	   inherently	  self-­‐interested	  about	  donor	  countries’	  giving	  a	  degree	  of	  priority	   to	  engagement	  with	   their	   own	   business	   sectors,	   and	   any	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	  development	  that	  grow	  from	  such	  engagement	  must	  be	  evaluated	  on	  their	  merits.	  The	   universe	   of	   possible	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   development	   is	   quite	   large,	  sparsely	  populated	  and	  largely	  uncharted.	   	  Donors	  tend	  to	  advertise	  such	  partnerships	  in	  very	  general	   terms,	  and	  often	  as	   if	  partnership	  were	  an	  end	   in	   itself.	   	  There	   is	  very	  little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   guidance	   or	   codified	   experience	   for	   a	   donor—Australia,	   for	  example—wishing	   to	   expand	   its	   engagement	  with	   business	   from	  a	   low	  base.	   	  Donors,	  
                                                




and	  also	  their	  prospective	  business	  partners,	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  forms	  of	  practical	  partnership	  might	  be	  constructed,	  for	  what	  purposes	  and	  with	  what	  likely	  impact.	  	  	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  present	  paper	  proposes	  a	  new	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   development,	   provides	   brief	   case	   studies	   of	   activities	   within	  that	  framework	  that	  exemplify	  four	  categories	  of	  partnership,6	  and	  identifies	  some	  key	  questions	   for	  consideration	  or	   further	  research	   in	  connection	  with	  each	  category.	   	  Our	  aim	   is	   to	   provide	   greater	   clarity	   about	   the	   several	   purposes	   that	  might	   be	   served	   by	  public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   development,	   and	   about	   the	   main	   practical	   questions	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  connection	  with	  each	  category	  of	  partnership.	  	  Our	  larger	  aim	  is	   to	  help	   lay	  some	  of	   the	  groundwork	  for	   the	  development	  of	  practical	  principles	   that	  might	  guide	  decisions	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  aid	   funds	  to	  development	  partnerships	  with	  the	   private	   sector,	   as	   well	   as	   decisions	   on	   the	   design	   and	   management	   of	   these	  partnerships.	  	  Such	  principles	  are,	  at	  present,	  either	  lacking,	  implicit,	  or	  very	  general.	  
2.	  	  Framework	  for	  the	  discussion	  
Foreign	   firms	   operating	   in	   developing	   countries	   often	   undertake	   or	   sponsor	   various	  forms	   of	   development	   assistance	   under	   their	   own	   steam	   for	   several	   reasons.	   	   They	  consider	   it	   the	  right	   thing	   to	  do,	  or	  need	  a	  social	   licence	   to	  operate,	  or	  want	  a	  healthy	  and	  well-­‐educated	  workforce,	   or	   need	   a	   strong	   base	   of	   local	   suppliers.	   	   Perhaps	   they	  believe	  that	  being	  perceived	  as	  responsible	  and	  generous,	  both	  within	  and	  beyond	  their	  zone	  or	  sector	  of	  operation,	  gives	  them	  a	  competitive	  advantage.	  	  	  Such	  efforts	  in	  themselves	  are	  not	  our	  concern	  here.	  	  The	  subject	  of	  the	  present	  paper	  is	  what	  might	  be	   termed	   “ground-­‐level”	  engagement	  between	   international	  development	  agencies	   and	   firms	   operating	   in	   developing	   countries—more	   specifically,	   engagement	  that	  involves	  a	  transfer	  of	  resources	  from	  a	  development	  agency,	  either	  to,	  through	  or	  in	  close	   co-­‐operation	   with	   a	   private	   sector	   partner,	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   achieving	   or	  enhancing	   development	   outcomes	   for	   poor	   countries	   or	   specific	   groups	   within	   them.	  	  
                                                




The	  general	  question	  is:	  	  how	  can	  public	  resources—both	  financial	  and	  human—be	  used	  to	  best	  effect	  to	  maximise	  the	  development	  impact	  of	  private	  sector	  activity?	  We	   are,	  moreover,	   not	   discussing	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   in	   the	  most	   commonly-­‐encountered	   sense	   of	   that	   term—that	   is,	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   (PPPs)	   for	  infrastructure.	   	   PPPs	   for	   infrastructure	   do	   not	   normally	   involve	   direct	   engagement	  between	   development	   agencies	   and	   private	   investors	   and	   developers,	   though	  development	  agencies	  will	   sometimes	  play	  an	  enabling	   role	  with	   respect	   to	   these	  PPP	  transactions.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  output-­‐based	  aid,	  development	  agencies	  do	  subsidise	  private	  service	  providers	   to	  extend	  services	   to	  poor	  communities	  (this	  kind	  of	  arrangement	   is	  touched	   upon	   in	   section	   5).	   	   While	   agencies	   such	   as	   the	   International	   Finance	  Corporation	   (IFC)	   and	   the	   Private	   Infrastructure	   Development	   Group	   (PIDG)7	   work	  directly	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  facilitate	  investment	  in	  PPPs	  in	  developing	  countries,	  they	   operate	   with	   a	   broad	   growth-­‐promotion	   objective.	   	   Though	   they	   conduct	   socio-­‐economic	  impact	  assessments,	  they	  do	  not	  systematically	  aim	  to	  include	  poorer	  sections	  of	  the	  community	  as	  input	  suppliers	  or	  consumers.	  Two	  other	  forms	  of	  engagement	  between	  international	  development	  agencies	  and	  firms	  operating	   in	   developing	   countries	   are	   also	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   paper.	   	   The	   first	  relates	  to	  broad	  consultation	  and	  knowledge-­‐sharing	  in	  the	  development	  of	  general	  aid	  policy,	   country	   strategies	   and	   sector-­‐specific	   policies	   and	   strategies.	   	   Official	  development	   agencies	   and	   the	  private	   sector	   do	  not	   currently	   interact	  much	  on	   these	  topics,	  certainly	  nowhere	  near	  as	  much	  as	  development	  agencies	  and	  non-­‐government	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  do.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  discussion	  at	  AusAID’s	  August	  2012	  consultative	  forum	  with	  business	  centered	  on	  this	  form	  of	  engagement.	  	  It	  is	  almost	  the	  sole	  form	  of	  engagement	   indicated	  in	  AusAID’s	  Business	  Engagement	  Agenda.	   	  AusAID’s	   interaction	  with	   business	   since	   the	   August	   2012	   forum,	   up	   to	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   has	   consisted	  primarily	  in	  the	  sharing	  of	  perspectives	  on	  development	  challenges	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Pacific.	  	  Dialogue	  of	  this	  nature	  is	  undoubtedly	  valuable	  and	  overdue,	  but	  sits	  above	  the	  level	  of	  practical	  cooperation	  that	  is	  our	  concern.	  	  	  
                                                




The	  second	  category	  of	  engagement	  that	  we	  are	  not	  here	  addressing,	  important	  though	  it	  is,	  relates	  to	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  “corporate	  conduct”.	  	  A	  variety	  of	  codes,	  structures	  and	  processes	  have	  been	  established	  at	  the	  global	  and	  national	  level—for	  example,	  the	  UN	   Global	   Compact	   and	   its	   various	   country-­‐specific	   private	   sector	   networks—to	  encourage	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  conduct	  business	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  beneficial,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  harmful,	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  in	  developing	  countries.	   	  Again,	  there	  is	  not	  currently	  much	  engagement	  between	  official	  development	  agencies	  and	  the	  private	  sector	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   framing	   and	   implementation	   of	   the	   corporate	   conduct	  agenda.	   	  It	  might	  be	  that	  there	  is	  little	  need	  for	  such	  engagement,	  and	  that	  the	  conduct	  agenda	   is	   best	   driven	   by	   the	   corporate	   sector	   itself,	   or	   through	   dialogue	   between	   the	  corporate	  sector	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  we	  leave	  this	  topic	  aside.8	  	  	  Even	   with	   the	   above	   exclusions,	   it	   is	   a	   problem	   that	   the	   term	   “public-­‐private	  partnership”	  is	  so	  bewilderingly	  catholic.	  	  Its	  meaning	  needs	  to	  be	  broken	  down	  in	  some	  way	  in	  order	  to	  permit	  sensible	  discussion.	   	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  structuring	  the	  present	  discussion,	   we	   have	   started	   with	   two	   very	   broad	   categories	   of	   partnership	   between	  development	   agencies	   and	   firms.	   	   We	   have	   then	   subdivided	   them	   into	   two	   further	  categories.	   	   Our	   taxonomy,	   as	   detailed	   below,	   might	   of	   course	   be	   considered	   a	   little	  arbitrary.	   	  Some	  might	  think	  we	  have	  drawn	  distinctions	  where	  there	  are	  none,	  others	  that	   we	   have	   not	   drawn	   enough.	   	   However,	   we	   consider	   it	   useful	   without	   being	  excessively	  fine-­‐grained.	  	  	  The	   first	   category	   is	   inclusive	   business,	   which	   comprises	   approaches	  whose	   common	  feature	   is	   that	   they	   promote	   development	   through	   “core”	   business	   activity.	   	   These	  approaches	  are	  inclusive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  bring	  poor	  people	  into	  the	  orbit	  of	   business	   activity	   as	   suppliers,	   workers	   or	   consumers,	   without	   compromising	  commercial	   viability	   or	   competitiveness.	   	  Within	   this	   category,	  we	   separately	   identify	  and	  discuss	  consumer-­‐oriented	  approaches	  that	  have	  a	  normative	  dimension	  relating	  to	  fairness	  or	   sustainability	   (usually	  embodied	   in	  minimum	  standards)	   in	   the	  production	  process	   and	   along	   the	   supply	   chain.	   	   The	   consumers	   and	   norms	   are	   of	   the	   developed	  
                                                




world;	  the	  supply	  chain	  originates	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  We	  place	  this	  latter	  subset	  of	  approaches	   under	   the	   unlovely	   heading	   “pro-­‐poor	   supply	   chains	   for	   internationally-­‐traded	  products”.	  	  	  Our	  second	  broad	  category	  is	  the	  private	  sector	  provision	  of	  public	  goods,	  within	  which	  we	  distinguish	  local	  or	  national	  public	  goods—in	  particular,	  universal	  public	  health	  and	  education	  services9—from	  international	  or	  global	  public	  goods,	  such	  as	  vaccines	  or	  new	  crop	   varieties.	   	   The	   former,	   in	   which	   development	   agencies	   use	   the	   corporate	  infrastructure	  and	   logistical	  capabilities	  of	  private	  sector	  entities	   to	  deliver	  services	   to	  the	   poor,	   we	   place	   under	   the	   heading	   “public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	   service	  delivery”10;	   the	   latter,	   in	  which	  development	  agencies	  subsidise	  product	  discovery	  and	  development,	   under	   the	   heading	   “product	   development	   partnerships”.	   	   This	   term	   is	  admittedly	   not	   particularly	   self-­‐explanatory	   but	   it	   already	   has	   currency	   in	   the	   health	  sector.	  	  	  In	  all,	  then,	  we	  are	  working	  with	  four	  categories	  of	  partnership.	  	  The	  first	  two	  promote	  the	  production	  and	  exchange	  of	  private	  goods,	  albeit	  with	  interventions	  by	  development	  agencies	  on	  the	  supply	  or	  demand	  side	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  development	  outcomes.	  	  The	  second	  two	  involve	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  through	  or	  by	  the	  private	  sector,	  with	  development	  agencies	  meeting	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  associated	  costs.	  	  	  It	  will	  be	  apparent	  from	  the	  above	  that	  our	  subject	  is	  not	  private	  sector	  development	  as	  such.	  	  The	  two	  categories	  of	  partnership	  relating	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  involve	  the	  pursuit	  of	  human	  development	  outcomes.	  	  That	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  social	  sectors—arrangements	  sharing	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  health-­‐sector	  product	  development	   partnerships	   also	   exist	   in	   agriculture,	   and	   some	   output-­‐based	   aid	  partnerships	   involve	   the	   provision	   of	   hardware	   at	   the	   household	   level,	   such	   as	  
                                                




infrastructure	   for	   water	   supply	   and	   energy	   connections—but	   it	   does	   mean	   that	   such	  partnerships	  do	  not	  have	  as	  their	  principal	  objective	  the	  development	  of	  markets.	   	  The	  inclusive	  business	  category	  does	  of	  course	  represent	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  private	  sector	  development.	   	   However,	   interventions	   in	   this	   category	   have	   quite	   a	   specific	   purpose.	  	  The	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  promote	  private	  sector	  development	  in	  general,	  or	  even	  with	  respect	  to	  particular	  locations	  or	  value	  chains.	  	  That	  requires	  action	  on	  a	  range	  of	  fronts,	  including	  support	   for	   improvements	   in	   the	   enabling	   environment.	   	   Rather,	   inclusive	   business	  approaches	  aim,	  in	  a	  given	  environment,	  to	  catalyse	  a	  shift	   from	  less	  inclusive	  to	  more	  inclusive	  private	  sector	  activity.	  	  	  	  
3.	  	  Inclusive	  business	  
The	  concept	  of	  inclusive	  business	  is	  generally	  explained	  as	  the	  conduct	  of	  core	  business	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  benefits	  people	  who	  occupy	  the	  “base	  of	  the	  economic	  pyramid”11	  as	  producers	  or	  consumers	  of	  goods	  or	  services.	  	  In	  turn,	  core	  business	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  business	  undertaken	  for	  none	  other	  than	  commercial	  objectives,	  and	  the	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid	   is	  most	  often	  defined	  as	   the	   four	  billion	  people	  whose	  annual	  consumption	   is	  below	   about	   $US3,000	   in	   local	   purchasing	   power	   terms.	   	   The	   base	   of	   the	   pyramid	   is	  several	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  category	  of	  absolute	  poor.	  	  	  Much	  of	  what	  one	  would	  consider	  to	  be	  inclusive	  business	  activity	  is	  undertaken	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  assistance	  of	  international	  development	  agencies.	  	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  discussion	  about	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  development	  in	  the	  academic	  literature12,	  in	  peak	   business	   circles13	   and	   in	   high-­‐level	   multilateral	   forums	   such	   as	   the	   World	  Economic	  Forum14,	  the	  G2015	  and	  the	  United	  Nations16.	  	  Most	  of	  this	  discussion	  proceeds	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  development	  agencies	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  do	  and	  should	  play	  largely	  separate,	  complementary	  roles.	  	  	  
                                                




When	   interaction	   between	   development	   agencies	   and	   the	   business	   community	   is	  explicitly	   considered17,	   it	   is	   generally	   said	   that	   development	   agencies	   can	   play	   three	  main	  roles	  in	  making	  business	  activity	  more	  inclusive	  of	  the	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid:	  	  	  
• improving	   the	   knowledge	   base	   for	   inclusive	   business	   activity,	   particularly	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  on	  opportunities	  and	  effective	  approaches;	  
• providing	  risk-­‐sharing	  subsidies	  to	  early	  market	  entrants	  and/or	  innovators;	  and	  	  
• exercising	   convening	   power	   in	   order	   to	   broker	   inclusive	   business	   partnerships	  between	  private	  sector,	  public	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  actors.	  	  	  In	  short,	  the	  role	  envisaged	  for	  development	  agencies	  is	  to	  help	  provide	  the	  public	  goods	  (knowledge	   and	   disinterested	   convening	   services)	   that	   are	   important	   for	   inclusive	  business	   activity,	   and	   to	   help	   overcome	   market	   failures	   which	   relate	   mainly	   to	  information	  deficits	  and	  consequent	  misperceptions	  of	  opportunity	  and	  risk.	  	  	  Inclusive	  business	  ventures	  operate	  across	  the	  economy.	   	  The	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid	  can	  provide	  produced	  inputs	  and	  labour	  to	  agribusiness,	  manufacturing,	  resource	  extraction	  and	   tourism	   ventures,	   and	   may	   consume	   goods	   and	   services	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   water	  supply,	   sanitation,	   transport,	   energy,	   telecommunications	   and	   finance.	   	   Transport	   and	  finance	  deserve	  special	  mention—the	  former	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  poor	  to	  access	  goods,	  services	   and	   markets,	   and	   the	   latter	   because	   access	   to	   finance	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   for	  people’s	  participation	  as	  producers	  and	  consumers	  in	  a	  market	  economy.	  	  The	  provision	  of	   financial	   services—savings,	   loans	   and	   insurance—to	   the	   “unbanked”	   poor,	   through	  support	   for	  micro-­‐finance	   institutions,	  has	  been	  by	  far	  the	  most	  prominent	  example	  of	  donor	  support	  for	  inclusive	  business	  to	  date.	  	  	  
3.1.	  	  Risk-­‐sharing	  mechanisms	  
It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   for	   large-­‐scale	   business	   ventures,	   the	   International	   Finance	  Corporation	  (IFC)	  exists	  as	  a	  specialised	  agency	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  to	  provide	  debt,	  equity	  and	  guarantees	  to	  help	  reduce	  project	  risks	  perceived	  by	  private	  investors	  in	   developing	   countries.	   	   However,	   even	   though	   the	   IFC	   is	   prominent	   in	   global	  discussions	   about	   inclusive	   business,	   its	   model	   primarily	   involves	   a	   “whole	   pyramid”	  
                                                




approach18—that	  is,	  it	  works	  with	  companies	  that	  sometimes	  get	  their	  inputs	  or	  extend	  their	  services	  to	  the	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid,	  but	  do	  not	  exclusively	  target	  the	  latter	  market	  —and,	  generally	  speaking,	  it	  operates	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  bilateral	  and	  non-­‐government	  development	  agencies.	  	  	  At	  present,	   the	  main	   instrument	  used	  by	  bilateral	  development	  agencies	   for	  providing	  subsidies	   to	   inclusive	   business	   ventures	   is	   the	   “enterprise	   challenge	   fund”.	   	   Australia	  operates	  such	  a	  fund	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region19,	  similar	  to	  one	  established	  by	  the	  UK	  in	  Africa20,	  which	  now	  has	  support	  from	  multiple	  donors	  including	  Australia21.	  	  Enterprise	  challenge	   funds	   involve	   one	   or	   more	   calls	   for	   inclusive	   business	   proposals	   that	   are	  assessed	  competitively.	  	  Successful	  proposals	  attract	  grants	  or	  sometimes	  success-­‐linked	  loans	  on	  a	  matching	  basis,	  with	  the	  firm	  required	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  is	  really	  putting	  some	  capital	  (“hurt	  money”)	  at	  risk.	  	  A	  successful	  proposal	  must	  demonstrate	  that	  an	  activity	  has	  reasonable	  prospects	  of	  achieving	  commercial	  viability	  within	  a	  certain	  timeframe,	  that	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   deliver	   strong	   development	   impacts,	   and	   that	   it	   has	   little	   or	   no	  prospect	  of	  proceeding	  without	  the	  subsidy.22	  	  	  All	   this	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  explain	   in	  a	  nutshell	   to	  those	   instinctively	  opposed	  to	  using	  aid	  funds	  to	  subsidise	  private	  sector	  activity.	  	  The	  “viable	  but	  not	  viable	  right	  now”	  test	  is	  a	  technical	  one	  but	  is	  reliant	  on	  many	  assumptions	  and	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  apply	  without	  subjectivity.	   	   The	   “wouldn’t	   proceed	   without	   the	   subsidy”	   test	   involves	   evaluating	   a	  counterfactual	   conditional	   and	  will	   often	   require	  assumptions	  about	  what	  a	  particular	  firm’s	  board	  might	  have	  decided	  to	  do	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  prospect	  or	  knowledge	  of	  an	  aid	  subsidy.23	  	  Critics	  of	  enterprise	  challenge	  funds	  therefore	  feel	  able	  to	  accuse	  them	  of	  adding	  gratuitously	  to	  the	  profits	  of	  wealthy	  corporations.	  	  There	  will	  rarely	  be	  a	  knock-­‐
                                                




down	   argument	   to	   use	   in	   response	   to	   such	   accusations	   in	   particular	   cases,	   but	   the	  underlying	  logic	  of	  enterprise	  challenge	  funds	  is	  not	  thereby	  impugned.	  	  	  A	  challenge	  fund	  grant	  might	  be	  used	  for	  specific	  purposes	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  project	  proponent	  and	  is	  sometimes	  attributed	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  necessary	  for	  a	  project	   to	   succeed,	   such	   as	   financial	   literacy	   training	   (see	   Box	   1).	   	   However,	   such	  attribution	   is	   really	   cosmetic.	   	   The	   effect	   of	   the	   grant	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   ratio	   of	   risk	   to	  expected	  return	  to	  a	  level	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  the	  proponent.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  enterprise	  challenge	   funds	   are	   normally	   presented	   as	   “risk-­‐sharing”	   mechanisms.	   	   To	   achieve	   a	  decisive	  impact	  on	  the	  risk-­‐return	  ratio,	  the	  overall	  investment	  has	  to	  be	  quite	  small	  or	  the	  grant	  quite	  large.	  	  Generally	  the	  former	  is	  the	  case	  (Binder	  et	  al.	  	  2007).	  	  The	  grant	  is	  usually	  paid	  up	  front	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  proposal,	  or	  in	  tranches	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  milestones.	  	  	  In	  principle,	   challenge	   fund	  grants	  could	  also	   take	   the	   form	  of	   results-­‐based	  payments	  that	   are	   linked,	   for	   example,	   to	   demonstrated	   impact	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  consumption	  of	  a	  beneficial	  good	  or	  service	  by	  poor	  people,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  other	  benefits	  such	   as	   employment.	   	   The	   AgResults	   initiative,	   an	   agricultural	   “pull	   mechanism”24	  launched	  at	  the	  G20	  summit	  in	  Los	  Cabos	  in	  2012	  will	  involve	  such	  payments,	  and	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	   inclusive	  business	   initiative	  with	  results-­‐based	  subsidies	  (AgResults	  Steering	   Committee	   2012).	   	   At	   least,	   the	   initial	   pilot	   projects	   to	   be	   supported	   by	  AgResults	   have	   this	   character;	   later	   pilots	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   involve	   the	   provision	   of	  incentives	   for	   product	   discovery	   and	   development,	   and	   will	   not	   necessarily	   link	  payments	  to	  the	  level	  of	  product	  adoption.	  
Box	  1:	  	  WING	  Cambodia	  WING	  is	  a	  provider	  of	  mobile	  phone	  payment	  services	  that	  allow	  customers	  to	  transfer,	  store	  and	  access	  their	  money	  using	  a	  mobile	  phone	  at	  low	  cost.25	  	  Established	  in	  2008,	  it	  was	   originally	   conceived	   as	   targeting	   garment	   factory	   workers	   in	   urban	   areas,	   other	  workers	  of	  rural	  origin	  and	  the	  student	  population	  in	  urban	  areas.	  	  However,	  roughly	  80	  
                                                




per	   cent	   of	   the	   Cambodian	   population	   of	   about	   14	  million	   people	   lives	   in	   rural	   areas.	  	  Some	  35	  per	  cent	  of	  these	  people	  live	  on	  less	  than	  $US1.25	  a	  day.	  	  	  WING	   received	   a	   grant	   of	   $A1.5	  million	   from	   Australia’s	   Enterprise	   Challenge	   Fund	  (ECF)	   for	   the	   Pacific	   and	   South	   East	   Asia	   in	   2009	   to	   help	   expand	   its	   services	   to	   rural	  provinces.	   	  WING	   used	   this	   funding,	   constituting	   about	   25	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   the	  expansion	  project,	  to	  fund	  initial	  education	  programs	  that	  built	  community	  awareness	  of	  mobile	   technology	   and	   banking,	   and	   financial	   literacy	   campaigns.	   	  WING’s	   own	   funds	  were	  used	   for	  mobile	   technology,	  advertising	  and	  staff	  costs.	   	  WING	  would	   likely	  have	  expanded	   into	   the	   rural	   market	   sooner	   or	   later	   but	   the	   ECF	   grant	   accelerated	   this	  process	   and	   allowed	   the	   company	   to	   expand	   in	   both	   urban	   and	   rural	   areas	  simultaneously,	  thus	  “closing	  the	  payment	  ecosystem	  loop”	  between	  the	  two	  areas.	  	  	  WING’s	  mobile	  payment	  service	  allows	  money	  earned	  in	  urban	  areas	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	   rural	   relatives,	   and	   sometimes	   vice	   versa.	   	   It	   also	   provides	   a	   secure	   way	   for	  individuals	  and	  small	  businesses	  to	  purchase	  goods	  and	  services,	  and	  supports	  payroll	  processing	  and	  bill	  payment.	  	  It	  is	  anticipated	  that	  rural	  users	  of	  the	  service	  might	  save	  up	  to	  $US16.8	  million	  per	  annum	  in	  transaction	  costs	  relative	  to	  more	  traditional	  ways	  of	   transferring	   funds,	   with	   internal	   remittances	   charged	   at	   only	   $US0.10	   and	  withdrawals	  $US0.40.	  	  	  After	  three	  years,	  WING	  has	  signed	  up	  around	  380,000	  customers,	  of	  whom	  82	  per	  cent	  are	  in	  rural	  areas26	  and	  34	  per	  cent	  women.	  	  The	  value	  of	  remittance	  transactions	  grew	  from	  less	  than	  $US1	  million	  in	  early	  2011	  to	  over	  $US12	  million	  in	  September	  2012,	  just	  under	  half	  of	  all	  Cambodia’s	  documented	  domestic	  remittances.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  at	   one	   point	   some	  87	   per	   cent	   of	   customers	  were	   inactive	   –	   a	   point	   to	   be	   considered	  when	  the	  “reach”	  of	   initiatives	   like	  this	   is	  advertised	  –	  but	  also	  that	  the	  global	  average	  active	   user	   rate	   for	  mobile	   payment	   systems	   is	   only	   around	   eight	   per	   cent.	   	  WING	   is	  investing	  additional	  funds	  to	  increase	  active	  user	  rates,	  particularly	  by	  facilitating	  access	  to	  cheap	  Khmer-­‐enabled	  phone	  handsets	  and	  encouraging	  customers	  to	  use	  third-­‐party	  payment	  agents	  to	  assist	  with	  transactions.	  
                                                




Refresh	  Mobile,	   a	   company	   that	   operates	   a	   point-­‐of-­‐pay	   technology	   service	  with	   over	  8,000	  outlets	   in	  Cambodia,	  purchased	  WING	   in	   late	  201127.	   	  An	  assessment	  of	  WING’s	  commercial	  viability	  at	   that	   time	   indicated	  that	   it	  would	  be	  close	  to	  break-­‐even	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2012.	  	  Two	  reviews	  of	  the	  ECF	  made	  very	  positive	  findings	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  grant	  to	  WING,	  while	  raising	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  about	  the	  use	  of	  ECF	  funds	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  create	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  competitors.	  	  	  WING	   is	   now	   looking	   to	   further	   strengthen	   its	   position	   by	   establishing	   additional	  partnerships	   with	   telecommunications	   companies	   and	   micro-­‐finance	   institutions,	  expanding	   financial	   literacy	   training,	   acquiring	   larger	   payroll	   processing	   accounts	   and	  exploring	  options	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  enormous	  market	  for	  international	  remittance	  services.	  	  In	   addition,	  WING’s	   rapid	   expansion	  has	   sparked	   interest	   from	  development	   agencies,	  such	  as	   the	  World	  Food	  Programme,	   that	   could	   lead	   to	  an	  expansion	  of	   its	   services	   to	  facilitate	   access	   to	   finance	   for	   poor	   “day	   to	   day	   survivors”.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   a	   small	  injection	  of	  aid	  helped	  WING	  to	  grow	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  now	  looks	  attractive	  as	  a	  delivery	  channel	  for	  potentially	  much	  larger	  volumes	  of	  aid.	  
This	  summary	  case	  study	  draws	  on	  a	  presentation	  given	  by	  Anthony	  Perkins	  and	  Thiev	  Viseth	  of	  WING	  during	  
the	  Development	  Policy	  Centre’s	  forum,	  “Engaging	  business	  in	  development”,	  on	  17	  October	  2012.	  A	  number	  of	  bilateral	  donors	  run	  private	  sector	  “matchmaking”	  schemes28	   that	  at	   first	  glance	  might	  be	  taken	  for	  inclusive	  business	  financing	  mechanisms.	  	  They	  offer	  grants	  to	  foreign	  firms	  considering	  direct	  investment	  in	  ventures	  in	  developing	  countries,	  usually	  to	   support	   exploratory	   work	   (for	   example,	   “investment	   studies”),	   more	   detailed	  feasibility	  studies	  or	  small-­‐scale	  pilot	  activities.	   	  However,	  on	  closer	  inspection	  most	  of	  these	  schemes	  are	  outward	  trade	  and	  investment	  promotion	  vehicles.29	  	  Though	  funded	  by	   aid	   budgets,	   they	   are	   restricted	   to	   firms	   within	   the	   donor	   country30	   and	   seem	   to	  involve	  only	  a	  cursory	  assessment	  of	  development	  benefits	  at	  any	  level.	  	  In	  common	  with	  enterprise	   challenge	   funds	   they	   tend	   to	   have	   a	   competitive	   grant	   allocation	   process,	  
                                                




though	   this	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case,	   and	   a	   requirement	   that	   activities	   be	   capable	   of	  achieving	   commercial	   viability	   within	   a	   certain	   timeframe,	   but	   little	   else	   is	   similar.	  	  Australia	   ran	   such	   a	   scheme—the	   Private	   Sector	   Linkages	   Program—until	   the	   late	  1990s,	  when	  commercially-­‐motivated	  schemes31	  were	  terminated	  following	  a	  change	  of	  government.	  
3.2.	  	  Advisory	  and	  mixed	  services	  
In	   addition	   to	   enterprise	   challenge	   funds,	   some	   bilateral	   donors	   have	   established	  business	   advisory	   services	   of	   various	   kinds,	   including	   the	   UK	   government’s	   Business	  Innovation	  Facility,	  which	  has	  an	  explicit	  inclusive	  business	  mandate.	  	  Donors	  have	  also	  long	  funded	  advisory	  services	  (sometimes	  with	  internal	  or	  linked	  financing	  capacity,	  in	  which	  case	  we	  call	  them	  “mixed”	  services)	  that	  seek	  to	  foster	  the	  development	  of	  small	  and	   medium-­‐sized	   enterprises	   that	   generate	   employment	   and	   other	   local	   economic	  benefits.	   	  While	  not	  badged	  as	  inclusive	  business	  mechanisms,	  these	  services	  do	  target	  the	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid	  as	  suppliers	  of	  goods	  and	  labour	  and	  as	  consumers	  of	  inputs	  for	  smallholder	  production,	  if	  not	  so	  much	  as	  consumers	  of	  final	  products.	  	  	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  increasing	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  fostering	  inclusive	  business	  ventures	  has	  been	   accompanied	  by	   a	   declining	   emphasis	   on	   small-­‐to-­‐medium	  enterprise	   (SME)	  project	   development	   facilities—seen	   as	   expensive,	   not	   strategic	   and	   of	   indeterminate	  impact	   (IFC	   2005).	   	   These	   have	   to	   some	   extent	   been	   superseded	   by	   the	   more	   “light	  touch”	   challenge	   funds.	   	   What	   were	   previously	   IFC-­‐managed	   multi-­‐donor	   “project	  development	   facilities”	   in	   the	  Pacific,	   Indonesia	   and	   the	  Mekong	   sub-­‐region	  have	  now	  been	   rebadged	   as	   “enterprise	  development”	   or	   “private	   sector	  development”	   facilities,	  with	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   support	   for	   improvements	   in	   the	   business	   enabling	  environment,	   broad-­‐based	   capacity-­‐building	   for	   private	   enterprises	   and	   measures	   to	  include	  poor	  communities	  among	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  mainstream	  IFC	  investments.32	  	  	  In	  parallel	  with	  the	  declining	  emphasis	  on	  SME-­‐oriented	  project	  development	   facilities	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  enterprise	  challenge	  funds,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  “value-­‐chain”	   projects	   that	   seek	   to	   improve	   (by	  means	   of	   both	   technical	   advisory	   and	  
                                                




convening	   services,	   as	   well	   the	   provision	   of	   financial	   incentives)	   the	   functioning	   of	  markets	  for	  the	  produce	  of	  the	  rural	  poor.	  	  These	  are	  hands-­‐on,	  intricate	  private	  sector	  development	  programs	  that	  will	  often	   involve	  working	  with,	  and	  sometimes	  providing	  financial	   incentives	   to,	   medium-­‐	   to	   large-­‐scale	   business	   enterprises	   to	   make	   their	  production,	  marketing	  and	  distribution	  processes	  more	  inclusive	  of	  the	  rural	  poor.	  	  For	  example,	   suppliers	   of	   agricultural	   inputs	   such	   as	   fertilisers	  might	   be	   induced	   to	  make	  them	  available	  in	  smaller,	  more	  affordable	  packages.	  	  Advice	  and	  financial	  assistance	  is	  also	   provided	   to	   public	   sector	   entities,	   smaller	   businesses,	   smallholder	   farmers	   and	  cooperatives—that	  is,	  to	  any	  or	  all	  actors	  in	  a	  value	  chain,	  depending	  on	  where	  market	  failures	  are	  believed	  to	  exist.	  	  Australia	  has	  supported	  such	  a	  program	  in	  Cambodia	  since	  2010	  and	   is	   (at	   the	   time	  of	  writing)	  about	   to	   launch	  a	   similar	  program	   in	   Indonesia.33	  	  Because	  programs	  of	  this	  nature	  do	  not	  work	  exclusively	  with	  business,	  they	  tend	  not	  to	  carry	   the	   “inclusive	   business”	   label.	   	   However,	   given	   that	   their	   objective	   is	  fundamentally	  to	  develop	  inclusive	  value	  chains,	  and	  that	  much	  of	  their	  work	  is	  with	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  label	  fits	  much	  of	  what	  they	  do.	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.3	  Review	  and	  evaluation	  
For	   the	   most	   part,	   inclusive	   business	   funding	   and	   advisory	   programs	   do	   not	   lend	  themselves	   to	   rigorous	   evaluation.	   	   They	   support	   diverse	   private	   sector	   actors	   to	  undertake	   diverse	   activities	   with	   a	   high	   expectation	   of	   risk	   and	   often	  with	   only	   such	  impact	   information	  as	  can	  be	  collected	   from	  the	   firms	  supported.	   	   In	  addition,	  most	  of	  these	  programs	  have	  not	  been	   in	  operation	   for	   very	   long.	   	  On	   the	  basis	  of	   a	   thorough	  survey	   of	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   in	   this	   area	   for	   the	   Donor	   Committee	   for	  Enterprise	  Development,	  Heinrich	  (2013)	  observes	  that	  “we	  know	  relatively	  little	  about	  the	  results	  achieved,	  and	  in	  particular	  their	  development	  impacts.”	  	  Some	  lessons	  can	  be,	  and	  have	  been,	  drawn	  from	  early	  experience34—to	  the	  effect	  that:	  
• an	  excessively	  “light	  touch”	  approach	  involves	  false	  economies;	  
                                                




• funding	  should	  target	  carefully	  selected	  sectors	  and	  be	  combined	  with	  a	  depth	  of	  technical	   expertise	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   thorough	   analysis	   and	   effective	  implementation	  of	  proposals;	  	  
• care	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  maintain	  competitive	  neutrality,	  such	  that	  public	  support	  for	  a	  firm	  does	  create	  structural	  disadvantages	  for	  other	  firms	  wishing	  to	  enter,	  or	  operating	  in,	  the	  same	  market;	  and	  
• grant	   funds	   should,	   as	   far	   as	   possible,	   leverage	   rather	   than	   substitute	   for	  commercial	  financing.35	  	  	  Two	   reviews36	   of	  Australia’s	  Enterprise	  Challenge	  Fund	   for	   the	  Pacific	   and	  South	  East	  Asia	  have	  forcefully	  reiterated	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  lessons.	  	  	  Microfinance	  programs,	  given	  their	  maturity	  and	  geographic	  spread,	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  fuller	  evaluation	  than	  other	  inclusive	  business	  ventures,	  with	  mixed	  but	  often	  positive	  findings.37	   	   SME	   project	   development	   facilities,	   as	   noted	   above,	   have	   received	   more	  consistently	  negative	  reviews.	  	  Overall,	  one	  perceives	  a	  tendency	  for	  donors	  to	  oscillate	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   light-­‐touch	  approaches	  that	  use	   financial	   incentives	   to	  spur	  private	  sector	  entrepreneurship,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  advice-­‐heavy	  approaches	  that	  seek	  to	  address	  capacity	  and	  information	  deficits,	  coordination	  failures	  and	  sometimes	  also	  provide	  or	  arrange	  financing.	  	  As	  noted	  above	  in	  connection	  with	  several	  IFC	  project	  development	   facilities,	   advice-­‐heavy	   approaches	   are	   now	   less	   likely	   to	   operate	   at	   the	  level	  of	  individual	  projects	  or	  enterprises,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  operate	  across	  a	  sector	  or	  region	  containing	  multiple	  value	  chains.	  	  	  One	  could	  speculate	  that,	  in	  time,	  enterprise	  challenge	  funds	  will	  be	  found	  to	  share	  some	  of	   the	  weaknesses	  of	  project	  development	   facilities	  and	   that	   the	  emphasis	  will	   shift	   to	  more	   comprehensive	   value-­‐chain	   approaches,	   which	   offer	   a	   range	   of	   services	   to	   all	  relevant	   market	   actors.	   	   Alternatively,	   the	   latter	   approaches	   may	   be	   found	   to	   be	  excessively	  complex,	  and	  the	  emphasis	  might	  shift	  to	  more	  sophisticated	  challenge-­‐fund	  approaches—perhaps	  with	  greater	  use	  of	   results-­‐based	  subsidies	  and	  correspondingly	  
                                                




less	   reliance	   on	   up-­‐front	   project	   selection.	   	   It	   is	   not	   currently	   possible	   to	   reach	   any	  definitive	   conclusion	   about	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   enterprise	   challenge	   fund	   or	   value-­‐chain	  program	  models.	   	   	   A	   comparative	   assessment	   of	   existing	   programs	  within	   and	   across	  these	  two	  models,	  from	  an	  inclusive	  business	  perspective,	  does	  not	  currently	  exist,	  and	  would	  be	  a	  useful	  product	  for	  donors	  to	  have.	  	  	  	  
3.4.	  	  Key	  issues	  for	  consideration	  








For	  example,	  a	  donor’s	  country	  office	  might	  form	  a	  desire	  to	  allocate	  a	  substantial	  proportion	   of	   its	   resources	   to	   an	   enterprise	   challenge	   fund	   for	   a	   given	   sub-­‐national	   area	   or	   for	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole,	   after	   consideration	   of	   all	   the	  alternatives.38	  	  	  4. How	  large	  or	  small?	   	  As	  noted	  above,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  substantial	   impact,	  a	  donor	   subsidy	   has	   to	   be	   reasonably	   large	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  intended	  investment.	  	  Thus	  the	  investment	  scale	  in	  bilateral	  enterprise	  challenge	  funds	   has	   been	   quite	   small,	   owing	   to	   the	   limited	   resources	   allocated	   to	   those	  funds	  to	  date—which	  has	  tended	  to	  keep	  their	  less	  successful	  ventures	  under	  the	  radar.	   	   Larger-­‐scale	   investments	   are	   supported	   by	   the	   IFC	   and	  PIDG,	   but	   those	  programs	   are	   not	   pitched	   as	   inclusive	   business	   initiatives.	   	   This	   raises	   the	  question	  what	   the	  basis	   should	  be	   for	  determining	   the	   range	  of	   subsidies	   to	  be	  made	  available	  under	  risk-­‐sharing	  schemes.	   	   If	  one	  had	  an	  effectively	  unlimited	  amount	   of	  money	   to	   allocate	   through	   an	   enterprise	   challenge	  mechanism,	   how	  would	   one	   decide	   on	   the	  minimum	   and	  maximum	   grant	   amounts?	   	   To	   a	   large	  extent,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  suggested	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  actual	  cases	  to	  date,	  but	  pragmatic	  considerations—relating	   to	   the	   level	  of	  public	   tolerance	   for	  absolute	  losses—will	  also	  play	  a	  part.	  	  	  5. Pay	   for	   inputs,	   or	   results?	   	   The	   typical	   enterprise	   challenge	   fund	   approves	   a	  project	  proposal	  from	  a	  particular	  business,	  then	  subsidises	  said	  business	  to	  get	  the	  project	  going.	  	  The	  funding	  meets	  input	  costs.	  	  An	  alternative	  approach	  would	  be	   to	   reward	   a	   business	   or	   businesses	   after	   the	   fact	   for	   achieving	   specified	  inclusive	  business	  impacts,	  for	  example	  by	  topping	  up	  prices	  paid	  by	  consumers	  for	  a	  certain	  product	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  	  This	  carries	  obvious	  advantages	  in	  principle:	  	  funds	  are	  released	  if	  and	  only	  if	  impact	  is	  demonstrated,	  and	  funds	  are	   released	   to	  whoever	   can	   demonstrate	   impact,	   rather	   than	   to	   a	   single,	   pre-­‐selected	   project	   proponent.	   	   Provided	   the	   promise	   to	   pay	   is	   credible,	   the	  incentive	   effect	   should	   operate	   for	   any	   companies	   with	   sufficient	   up-­‐front	  financing	   capacity.	   	   Results-­‐based	   payment	   involves	   very	   substantial	   design	  challenges,	  which	  fall	  heavily	  on	  the	  funding	  agency.	  	  One	  must	  know	  in	  advance	  
                                                




what	   result	   one	   is	   aiming	   for,	   and	   roughly	   what	   it	   should	   cost	   to	   achieve	   it.	  	  However,	  if	  these	  challenges	  can	  be	  overcome,	  results-­‐based	  payment	  could	  help	  maintain	  competitive	  neutrality	  and	  deliver	  benefits	  to	  multiple	  actors	  in	  a	  given	  market,	  rather	  than	  privileging	  a	  single	  actor.	  	  	  6. Subsidise	  by	  means	  of	  grants	  or	  success-­‐linked	  loans?	  	  The	  risk-­‐sharing	  mechanism	  does	  not	  exist	  to	  compete	  with	  banks,	  so	  will	  not	  provide	  debt.	  	  However,	  in	  some	  cases	   success-­‐linked	   loans	   might	   stretch	   resources	   and	   deliver	   the	   desired	  incentive	  effect,	  given	  that	  the	  loan	  is	  converted	  to	  a	  grant	   in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  supported	   project	   does	   not	   achieve	   viability	   within	   a	   certain	   timeframe.	   	   For	  small	   projects,	   success-­‐linked	   loans	   might	   be	   too	   complex	   for	   proponents	   and	  administratively	   onerous	   for	   development	   agencies.	   	   For	   larger-­‐scale	   projects,	  they	  might	   begin	   to	   be	   attractive.	   	   Another	   option	   further	   along	   this	   spectrum,	  and	  involving	  high	  levels	  of	  complexity,	  is	  for	  the	  development	  agency	  to	  function	  as	  an	  equity	  investor	  and,	  in	  time,	  either	  sell	  or	  write	  off	  its	  stake.	  	  	  




certain	   ways.	   	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   indication	   that	   anybody	   has	   explicitly	   and	  comprehensively	  weighed	  all	   these	  questions	   in	  designing	  such	  mechanisms.	   	   It	  would	  be	   desirable	   to	   have	   more	   systematic	   consideration	   of	   the	   above	   questions,	   both	   in	  general	  and	  before	  further	  such	  mechanisms39	  are	  launched.	  	  	  It	  would	  be	  still	  more	  desirable	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  basis	  of	  information	  on	  which	  to	  base	  answers	  to	  the	  above	  questions.	  	  At	  present	  there	  is	  simply	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  judge	  whether	   project-­‐level	   subsidies,	   largely	   unalloyed	   with	   other	   forms	   of	   assistance	   to	  firms	   or	   other	   actors	   in	   the	  markets	   in	   which	   those	   firms	   operate,	   are	   or	   are	   not	   an	  efficient	  or	  an	  effective	  instrument	  for	  promoting	  inclusive	  business.	  	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  be	   sure	   whether	   value-­‐chain	   programs,	   which	   make	   sense	   in	   principle,	   are	   really	  successful	   in	  dealing	  with	  so	  many	  actors,	  value	  chains	  and	  market	   failures	  under	  one	  roof.	   	   Nor	   are	   there	   processes	   in	   place	   for	   collecting	   the	   necessary	   evidence	   across	   a	  variety	  of	  donors,	  regions	  and	  sectors.	   	  Donors	  committed	  to	  supporting	  the	  growth	  of	  inclusive	  business	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  would	  do	  well	  to	  allocate	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  a	  collective	  reflection	  on	  experience	  to	  date,	  including	  through	  a	  multi-­‐donor,	   multi-­‐program	   evaluation	   of	   past	   and	   present	   enterprise	   challenge	   funds	   and	  value-­‐chain	  initiatives.	  	  This	  would	  help	  development	  agencies	  in	  their	  consideration	  of	  the	   various	   choices	   embodied	   in	   the	   seven	   questions	   above,	   and	   others,	   in	   a	   range	   of	  specific	  circumstances.	  	  	  
4.	  	  Pro-­‐poor	  supply	  chains	  for	  internationally-­‐traded	  products	  
As	   we	   indicated	   in	   section	   2,	   an	   important	   sub-­‐category	   of	   inclusive	   business	  approaches	   contains	   consumer-­‐oriented	   approaches	  with	   a	   normative	   dimension.	   	   By	  creating	   incentives	   for	   business	   and	   consumers	   to	   cooperate	   in	   various	   product	  certification	   and	   labeling	   schemes,	   these	   approaches	   seek	   not	   only	   to	   increase	   the	  involvement	   of	   poor	  producers	   in	   supply	   chains	  but	   also	   to	   improve	   fairness	   in	   those	  supply	   chains	   and/or	   minimise	   social	   and	   environmental	   harms	   associated	   with	  business	  activity,	  such	  as	  poor	  labour	  standards	  or	  illegal	  and	  unsustainable	  harvesting	  of	   natural	   resources.	   	   Given	   their	   reliance	   on	   influencing	   the	  buying	  habits	   of	   affluent	  consumers	   in	   developed	   countries,	   these	   approaches	   tend	   to	   involve	   internationally-­‐
                                                




traded	  products	   that	  mainly	  originate	   in	  developing	   countries	  or	   the	  global	   commons,	  undergo	   limited	   processing	   such	   that	   they	   remain	   recognisable40,	   and	   are	   mostly	  consumed	   in	   developed	   countries—such	   as	   coffee,	   ocean	   fish	   and	   products	  incorporating	  rainforest	  timber.	  Labeling	  and	  certification	  mechanisms	  are	  intended	  to	  allow	  producers	  and	  consumers	  to	   identify	   products	   considered	   to	   be	   produced	   and	   traded	   ethically	   and	   managed	  sustainably.	   	   They	   are	   promoted	   by	   organisations	   such	   as	   Fairtrade,	   the	   Forest	  Stewardship	   Council,	   the	  Marine	   Stewardship	   Council,	   the	  Rainforest	   Alliance	   and	   the	  World	  Wide	  Fund	   for	  Nature	   (WWF).	   	   Some	   large	   retailers	   also	   label	   goods	   as	  having	  met	   industry	  codes	  of	  practice,	   for	  example,	   environmental	  and	  agricultural	   standards	  for	   fresh	   produce.41	   	   These	   mechanisms	   are	   promoted	   as	   providing	   development	  benefits	   through	   the	   commercial	   relationships	   they	   establish	   between	   developing	  country	  producers	  and	  traders	  and	  developed	  country	  importers	  and	  consumers.	  	  	  Labeling	  and	  certification	  mechanisms	  usually	  operate	  as	   follows.42	   	  A	  development	  or	  environment	   organisation—generally	   an	   NGO—identifies	   farmers	   or	   other	   natural	  resource-­‐based	   producers	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   benefit	   from	   adopting	   productivity-­‐enhancing,	   environmentally-­‐sustainable	   practices.	   	   The	   sponsoring	   organisation	  provides	   technical	   and	   other	   support	   to	   these	   producers	   so	   that	   they	   can	   meet	  certification	   requirements,	   often	   in	   liaison	   with	   local	   extension	   services.	   	   Once	  producers	   have	   reached	   the	   required	   standards,	   the	   sponsoring	   organisation	   often	  assists	   them	   in	   gaining	   certification	   from	   the	   relevant	   authority.	   	   In	   many	   cases,	  sponsors	   also	   facilitate	   negotiations	  with	   potential	   buyers	   and	   use	   their	   international	  networks	  to	  help	  producers	  to	  access	  new	  markets.	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Fairtrade	  certification,	  producers	  gain	  access	  to	   long-­‐term	  contracts	  at	  a	  guaranteed	   minimum	   price	   plus	   a	   premium	   that	   is	   pooled	   for	   community-­‐endorsed	  investments.	   	   Importers	   and	   retailers	   gain	   access	   to	   long-­‐term	   supplies	   of	   quality	  
                                                




products	   to	   offer	   to	   customers.	   	   For	   the	   consumer,	   the	   value	   lies	   in	   the	   ability	   to	   buy	  products	  they	  consider	  to	  have	  development	  and	  environmental	  sustainability	  benefits.	  	  Customers	  willing	   to	  pay	  more	   for	   certified	  products	  might	   consider	   themselves	   to	  be	  meeting	   the	   costs	   of	   involving	  more	   poor	   producers	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	   or	   adopting	  higher	  standards	  of	  various	  kinds,	  or	  they	  might	  simply	  regard	  the	  additional	  cost	  as	  a	  form	   of	   “direct	   giving”	   to	   the	   poor	   producer	   community	   for	   development	   purposes.	  	  Licence	  fees	  paid	  by	  retailers,	  based	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  certified	  product	  that	  has	  been	  sold,	  provide	  ongoing	  income	  for	  the	  sponsoring	  organisation	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  provide	  support	   to	  producers	  and	  promote	  Fairtrade	   certified	  products	   among	  manufacturers,	  retailers	  and	  consumers.	  
4.1.	  	  Development	  impacts	  of	  labeling	  and	  certification	  mechanisms	  




link	  between	   international	   trade	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  has	  not	  been	  a	  strong	   focus	  of	  trade	  theory,	  and	  argues	  that	  poor	  people	  in	  rural	  areas	  lack	  economic	  power	  compared	  with	  major	  importing	  firms	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.	  	  2009).	  	  The	  authors	  propose	  that	  more	  value	  chain	  analysis	  be	  done	  to	   identify	  opportunities	   for	   the	  poor	  to	   improve	  their	  position	  and,	  by	  inference,	  their	  share	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  international	  trade.	  Critics	  of	  certification	  schemes	  contend43	  that	  where	  certification	  becomes	  a	  de	  facto	  or	  de	  jure	  requirement	  for	  market	  access,	  certification	  schemes	  reduce	  competition,	  force	  prices	  up,	  and	  impose	  additional	  and	  unreasonable	  compliance	  and	  administration	  costs	  on	  producers.	   	   Fairtrade	   certification,	   though	   less	   likely	   to	   raise	  market	   access	   issues,	  has	  also	  generated	  controversy	  over	  the	  years.	  	  Its	  proponents	  claim	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  higher	   farmer	   incomes,	  protection	   from	  damaging	  market	   instability,	   improvements	   in	  community	   infrastructure,	  and	  more	  sustainable	  farming	  practices;	   its	  critics	  claim44	   it	  disadvantages	  those	  who	  cannot	  meet	  its	  standards,	  fails	  farm	  labourers,	  and	  keeps	  poor	  farmers	   “in	   their	   place”	   by	   discouraging	   smallholders	   from	  diversifying	   production	   or	  leaving	  agriculture.	   	  Contesting	  this	   last	  point,	  Fairtrade	  points	  to	  examples	  of	   farmers	  diversifying	   their	   sources	   of	   income	   by	   investing	   pooled	   premiums	   in	   processing	  facilities	  or	  shares	  in	  manufacturing	  and	  retailing	  companies.	  	  	  	  A	   program	   evaluation	   published	   by	   the	   Centre	   for	   International	   Development	   Issues	  tests	  Fairtrade’s	  claims	  using	  case	  studies	   for	   two	  products	   in	   three	  countries	   (Ruben,	  Fort	   and	   Zuniga	   2008).	   	   It	   concludes	   that,	   although	   the	   direct	   net	   income	   effects	   on	  participants	  were	  modest,	  mainly	  because	  recent	  buoyant	  markets	  reduced	  Fairtrade’s	  price	   advantage,	   they	  were	   associated	  with	   better	   household	  nutrition.	   	   Farmers	  with	  access	   to	   long-­‐term	   contracts	   also	   exhibited	   a	   higher	   willingness	   to	   use	   credit,	   make	  yield-­‐enhancing	   investments	   and	   allocate	  more	   household	   expenditure	   to	   investment.	  	  The	   evaluation	   found	   that	   once	   Fairtrade	   reached	   a	   critical	   mass	   in	   one	   region,	   it	  generated	   spillover	   benefits	   in	   terms	   of	   higher	   prices	   and	   wages	   for	   all	   farmers	   and	  agricultural	  labourers.	  	  By	  contrast,	  there	  was	  not	  strong	  evidence	  of	  positive	  impacts	  on	  environmental	   management,	   and	   benefits	   from	   community	   investments	   were	   limited	  because	  pooled	  funds	  often	  remained	  unused.	  	   	  
                                                








marketing	   system	   for	   smallholders,	   processors	   and	   exporters	   (Fairtrade	   requires	  dialogue	   and	   cooperation	   along	   the	   supply	   chain).	   	   The	   Neknasi	   cooperative	   has	   also	  purchased	   vehicles	   to	   transport	   coffee	   and	   other	   farm	   produce	   to	   markets,	   and	  negotiated	  with	  the	  Forest	  Research	  Institute	  to	  provide	  seedlings	  for	  villages.	  Following	   Neknasi’s	   experience,	   in	   June	   2012	   CIC	   signed	   a	   memorandum	   of	  understanding	  with	  Fairtrade	  ANZ	  to	  work	  together	  through	  provincial	  farmer	  training	  and	   extension	   coordinators	   to	   enable	   Papua	   New	   Guinea	   producers	   to	   reach	   the	  Fairtrade	  market.	   	  Eight	  other	   farmer	  groups	   in	  Morobe	  province	  are	  now	  undergoing	  certification.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  lessons	  in	  implementing	  this	  program	  was	  the	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	   time	   Fairtrade	   participatory	   processes	   would	   require	   in	   Papua	   New	   Guinea,	  particularly	  given	  that	  coffee	  growing	  is	  only	  one	  activity	  for	  Neknasi	  farmers	  who	  also	  grow	  food	  for	  subsistence	  and	  local	  markets	  and	  participate	  in	  community	  activities.	  	  	  
This	  summary	  case	  study	  draws	  on	  a	  presentation	  given	  by	  Rachel	  Levine	  and	  Sandra	  Mendez	  of	  Fairtrade	  
ANZ	  and	  Michael	  Toliman	  of	  the	  Neknasi	  Coffee	  Growers	  Cooperative	  during	  the	  Development	  Policy	  Centre	  
forum,	  “Engaging	  business	  in	  development”,	  on	  17	  October	  2012.	  
4.2.	  	  What	  role	  for	  official	  development	  assistance?	  




partner.	  	  The	  Fund	  started	  in	  July	  2008,	  with	  grants	  from	  £150,000	  to	  £1	  million.	  	  It	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  evaluated.	  	  	  The	  Dutch	  and	  Danish	  aid	  programs	   fund	   IDH–The	  Sustainable	  Trade	   Initiative,	  which	  convenes	   public-­‐private	   coalitions	   to	   increase	   global	   trade	   in	   sustainably-­‐produced	  products	   and	   economically	   empower	   the	   poor.	   	   The	   initiative	   is	   based	   on	   a	  matched-­‐funding	   model.	   	   In	   2011,	   IDH	   program	   expenditure	   of	   €9.9	  million	   was	   matched	   by	  private	   partner	   contributions	   of	   €6.8	  million.	   	   One	   success	   cited	   by	   IDH	   is	   a	  collaboration	   that	   they	   have	   brokered	   in	   Vietnam	   between	   fish	   farmers,	   WWF,	  government	   and	   European	   traders	   to	   adapt	   production	   and	   working	   methods	   to	   the	  requirements	   of	   the	   Aquaculture	   Stewardship	   Council	   (ASC),	   so	   that	   Vietnamese	  products	  with	  the	  ASC	  logo	  are	  available	  in	  European	  supermarkets.	   	  Like	  the	  UK	  Food	  Retail	  Industry	  Challenge	  Fund,	  IDH	  started	  in	  2008	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  evaluated.	  Product	   certification	   schemes	   are	   administratively	   onerous,	   target	   a	   relatively	   small	  number	  of	  producers	  and	  account	  for	  a	  modest	  share	  of	  the	  international	  market.	  	  They	  are	  frequently	  couched	  in	  emotive	  or	  politically-­‐charged	  terms	  and	  have	  objectives	  that	  extend	   well	   beyond	   inclusive	   business.	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   that	   development	  agencies	   considering	   such	   schemes	   assess	   them	   dispassionately,	   and	   consider	   all	  alternatives	  for	   improving	  the	  livelihoods	  of	   farmers	  and	  other	  natural	  resource-­‐based	  producers.	   	   Development	   agencies	   should	   also	   take	   account	   of	   possible	   perverse	  consequences.	  	  For	  example,	  schemes	  to	  link	  farmers	  directly	  with	  importers	  or	  retailers	  frequently	  imply	  that	  “cutting	  out	  the	  middleman”	  is	  a	  desirable	  objective.	  	  However,	  the	  middlemen	  might	  well	  employ	  individuals	  who	  are	  no	  better-­‐off	  than	  the	  farmers	  whose	  products	   they	   handle.	   	   From	   a	   broad	   inclusive	   business	   perspective,	   cutting	   them	  out	  might	  be	  a	  net	  negative.	  	  	  
4.3.	  	  Key	  issues	  for	  consideration	  








incomes.	   	   Moreover,	   development	   agencies	   might	   be	   expected	   to	   favour	   a	  convergence	   of	   standards,	   given	   that	   a	   proliferation	   of	   them	   is	   confusing	   for	  consumers	   and	   therefore	   damaging	   to	   producers.	   	   For	   development	   agencies,	  therefore,	  maintaining	  “scheme	  neutrality”	  seems	  an	  important	  consideration.	  	  	  	  3. Avoiding	   vested	   interests.	   	   This	   follows	   from	   the	   previous	   point	   and	   the	  observation	   in	   the	   introductory	   paragraph	   that	   donor	   support	   for	   product	  certification	   arrangements	   tends	   to	   go	   to	   NGOs	   who	   link	   businesses	   and	  producers	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   their	   favoured	   certification	   standards.	   	   One	  alternative	  to	  this	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  fund	  business	  directly,	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  sub-­‐contract	  other	  parties	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  	  Another,	  better	  alternative	  would	  be	  to	  fund	   disinterested	   third-­‐party	   brokers,	   who	   can	   advise	   communities	   what	  arrangements	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   in	   their	   best	   interests,	   and	   help	   negotiate	   those	  arrangements.	  	  	  4. Evaluation.	   	   Given	   that	   a	   degree	   of	   confusion	   and	   controversy	   surrounds	  certification	   schemes,	   more	   robust	   assessment	   of	   past	   and	   present	   initiatives,	  including	  more	   independent	   evaluations,	  would	   assist	   in	   better	   informing	   both	  public	  debate	  and	  development	  agencies’	  programming	  decisions.	  	  While	  there	  is	  no	   good	   information	   on	   aggregate	   funding	   from	   aid	   sources	   for	   product	  certification	   schemes,	   it	   appears	   the	   level	   of	   funding	   is	   at	   present	   very	   low.	  	  Without	   better	   evaluation	   information,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   of	   knowing	   if	   this	   is	  appropriate.	  	  	  	  Regardless	   of	   debate	   about	   their	   impact,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   certification	   schemes	   are	   not	  going	  to	  go	  away	  and	  that	  there	  will	  be	  continuing	  demand	  from	  producer	  cooperatives	  and	   local	   businesses	   to	   achieve	   certification,	   either	   to	   gain	   advantage	   or	   avoid	  disadvantage.	   	  This	   implies	  a	  case	  for	  donor	  support	   for	  certification-­‐related	  measures	  aimed	  at	  improving	  competitiveness	  and	  access	  to	  markets	  for	  poor	  producers,	  if	  not	  for	  measures	  aimed	  at	  spreading	  the	  coverage	  of	  specific	  certification	  regimes.	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development.	  	  Less	  explored	  are	  resource	  flows	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction—to	  the	  private	  sector	   from	  aid	  agencies	  and	  developing	  country	  governments.	   	  This	  section	  considers	  the	  case	  for	  development	  agencies	  to	  invest	  resources	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  improve	  the	  delivery	  of	  basic	  services.	  At	   the	   outset,	   we	   should	   clarify	   that	   we	   are	   not	   dwelling	   on	   the	   case	   of	   private	  enterprises	  whose	   core	  business	   is	   the	  delivery	  of	  basic	   services,	   for	   example,	   private	  education	   or	   health	   providers,	  water	   supply	   and	   sanitation	   companies,	   or	   agricultural	  companies.	  	  In	  principle,	  there	  are	  opportunities	  for	  donors	  to	  support	  the	  extension	  of	  services	   to	   poor	   communities	   in	   partnership	  with	   private	   providers	   of	   those	   services.	  	  For	  example,	  output-­‐based	  aid	  programs	   in	  health,	  education,	  water	  supply,	   sanitation	  or	  energy	  distribution	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  configured	  as	  public-­‐private	  partnerships,	  if	  public	  subsidies	  were	  used	  to	  share	  risks	  with	  private	  partners,	  and	  gradually	  reduced	  as	   markets	   matured	   and	   risks	   declined.45	   	   Likewise,	   though	   less	   probably,	   service	  delivery	  partnerships	  could	  be	  established	  with	  private	  health	  and	  education	  providers	  if	   they	  were	  willing	   to	  absorb	  some	  ongoing	  costs.	   	  However,	   in	  general,	  output-­‐based	  aid	  programs	  and	  private	  sector	  service	  delivery	  programs	  in	  health	  and	  education	  are	  run	  along	  purchaser-­‐provider	  lines,	  with	  no	  costs	  or	  risks	  borne	  by	  the	  private	  partners.	  	  	  	  	  Our	  primary	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  private	  enterprises	  engaged	  in	  other	  commercial	  activities,	  particularly	  resource	  extraction,	  that	  choose	  to	  provide	  or	  support	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  services	   for	  the	  various	  reasons	  outlined	  earlier—regardless	  of	  whether	  those	  reasons	  are	   essentially	   commercial	   or	   moral	   in	   nature.	   	   We	   explore	   two	   kinds	   of	   practical	  partnership	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  basic	  services.	  	  The	  first	  involves	  a	  development	  agency	  providing	   in-­‐kind	  contributions,	   in	   the	   form	  of	  expert	  advice	  and	  support,	   to	   enhance	   private	   sector	   contributions	   to	   service	   delivery.	   	   The	   second	  involves	  development	  agencies	  funding	  private	  enterprises	  to	  expand	  and	  improve	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	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that	   they	   often	   spent	   large	   amounts	   on	   prevention	   programs	   known	   to	   have	   little	  effectiveness	  (Rudland	  2011).	  	  	  This	  example	  highlights	  a	  broader	   issue	   for	   resource-­‐rich	  developing	  countries.	   	  Many	  mining	  projects	  are	  located	  in	  remote	  areas	  that	  are	  among	  the	  poorest	  and	  most	  under-­‐serviced	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Resource	  companies	  are	  often	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  redressing	  these	  disadvantages	  through	  their	  employee	  and	  community	  programs.	   	   Development	   agencies,	   including	   AusAID,	   recognise	   the	   value	   of	   assisting	  developing	  countries	   to	  maximise	   the	  benefits	  and	  opportunities	  of	  mining.	   	  However,	  their	   focus	   to	  date	  has	  been	  mainly	  on	   improving	  governance,	   regulatory	  capacity	  and	  the	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   of	   payments	   to	   government,	   including	   through	  support	   for	   the	   multi-­‐donor	   Extractive	   Industries	   Transparency	   Initiative.	   	   AusAID’s	  Mining	   for	  Development	   initiative	   is	  a	  good	  example	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  donor	   support	   for	  resource-­‐rich	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  While	  such	  support	  is	  valuable,	  the	  missing	  link	  in	  most	  donor	  programs	  is	  activity	  that	  focuses	  on	  engaging	  with	  mining	  companies,	  government	  and	  local	  communities	  before	  operations	  commence.	   	  Such	  engagement	  would	  seek	  to	   identify	  the	  opportunities	  and	  risks	   posed	   by	   operations	   and	   facilitate	   planning	   by	   all	   parties	   (companies,	  governments,	   service	   providers	   and	   communities)	   to	   work	   cooperatively	   to	   mitigate	  negative	   impacts	   and	  maximise	   opportunities	   for	   affected	   communities	   over	   the	   long	  term.	   	   In	   Mongolia,	   Papua	   New	   Guinea,	   Solomon	   Islands	   and	   other	   mineral-­‐rich	  developing	   countries,	   development	   agencies	   could	   advocate	   for	   more	   effective	   and	  sustainable	  mining	   industry	   investments	   in	  basic	  health	   and	  education,	   infrastructure,	  law	  and	  justice,	  and	  local	  economic	  opportunity.	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One	  of	  the	  lessons	  for	  Oil	  Search	  in	  negotiating	  and	  implementing	  the	  HIV	  grant	  is	  that,	  by	  contrast	  with	  commercial	  contracting	  arrangements,	  all	  the	  risk	  in	  terms	  of	  program	  deliverables	   falls	   on	   the	   company,	   even	   though	   it	   has	   little,	   if	   any,	   control	   over	   the	  actions	  of	   its	  program	  partners.	   	  Oil	  Search	  sought	   to	  manage	   this	  risk	  by	  establishing	  contractual	  arrangements	  with	  sub-­‐recipients	  to	  monitor	  and	  audit	   their	  activities	  and	  to	  disburse	  funds	  progressively.	  	  Oil	  Search	  also	  agreed	  with	  the	  National	  Department	  of	  Health,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  significant	  components	  of	  the	  GFATM	  programs,	  that	  Oil	  Search	  would	  have	  authority	  over	  all	  grant	  finances	  and	  associated	  administrative	  tasks	  such	   as	   procurement	   of	   health	   products	   and	   services,	   and	   staff	   training,	   travel	   and	  allowances.	  
This	  summary	  case	  study	  draws	  on	  a	  presentation	  given	  by	  Ross	  Hutton	  of	  the	  Oil	  Search	  Health	  Foundation	  




work	   pragmatically	   with	   private	   sector	   partners.	   	   The	   ADB	   also	   learned	   that	   not	   all	  companies	  have	  the	  level	  of	  commitment,	  leadership	  and	  willingness	  to	  accept	  risks	  that	  are	  required	  for	  innovative	  programs	  such	  as	  this	  to	  succeed.	  
5.3.	  	  Development	  benefits	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  for	  service	  
delivery	  
The	   above	   examples	   suggest	   that	   donors	   should	   consider	   working	   with	   the	   private	  sector	  to	  provide	  basic	  services	  in:	  	  	  
− locations	  that	  are	  poorly	  served	  by	  government	  or	  private	  providers	  and	  where	  the	   private	   sector	   has	   a	   long-­‐term	   presence	   and	   a	   demonstrated	   capacity	   to	  deliver	  services	  effectively;	  
− circumstances	  where	  private	   sector	   innovations	   in	   service	  delivery	  are	  proving	  effective	  and	  worthy	  of	  replication;	  and/or	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arrangements,	   particularly	   in	   view	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   international	   guidelines	   for	  corporate	   responsibility	   and	   sustainability	   reporting	   increasingly	   emphasise	  outcomes	  and	  results.	   	   Indeed,	  new	  public-­‐private	  service	  delivery	  partnerships	  could	  provide	  opportunities	  to	  publicise	  the	  commitments	  of	  all	  relevant	  parties	  (aid	   agencies,	   private	   sector	   actors,	   government	   authorities	   and	   community	  organisations)	   in	   terms	   of	   responsibilities,	   risk-­‐sharing,	   specific	   inputs,	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation,	  and	  reporting.	  	  Aside	  from	  its	  benefits	  to	  aid	  agencies	  and	   their	   private	   sector	   partners,	   this	   approach	   could	   contribute	   to	   building	   a	  stronger	   culture	   of	   accountability	   for	   the	   delivery	   of	   basic	   services	   in	  communities.	  Though	   it	   relates	   to	   a	   process	   matter,	   the	   third	   of	   the	   above	   points	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  particularly	   important,	   and	  key	   to	   addressing	   the	  other	  points.	   	   In	   the	   absence	  of	   any	  credible,	   specialised	   and	   appropriately	   resourced	   capacity	   to	   broker	   partnerships	   for	  service	  delivery	  between	  development	  agencies	  and	  business,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  present	  situation	  will	  change.	  	  	  
6.	  	  Product	  development	  partnerships	  
In	  1990	  an	  international	  commission	  on	  health	  research	  for	  development	  drew	  attention	  to	   a	   “gross	   mismatch	   between	   the	   burden	   of	   illness,	   which	   is	   overwhelmingly	   in	   the	  Third	  World,	   and	   investment	   in	   health	   research,	  which	   is	   overwhelmingly	   focused	   on	  the	  health	  problems	  of	  industrialised	  countries”	  (COHRED	  1990).	  	  It	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “10/90	  gap”46	  with	  its	  finding	  that	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  only	  five	  per	  cent	   of	   the	   then	   $US30	  billion	   in	   annual	   global	   health	   research	   expenditure	   related	   to	  the	   health	   problems	   of	   developing	   countries,	   which	   bore	   93	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   world’s	  burden47	  of	  preventable	  mortality.	  	  This	  monumental	  market	  failure	  was	  worsened	  by	  a	  series	  of	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  in	  the	  global	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  during	  the	  late	  1990s	   which	   increased	   both	   investment	   thresholds	   and	   risk	   aversion.	   	   In	   the	   period	  1975	   to	   2000,	   only	   16	   of	   1,393	   medicines	   developed	   were	   for	   diseases	   specific	   to	  developing	  countries	  (Grace	  2010).	  	  	  
                                                




In	  response	  to	  this	  situation,	  international	  organisations,	  private	  foundations	  and	  some	  official	   donors	   progressively	   established	   a	   number	   of	   so-­‐called	   product	   development	  partnerships48	  (PDPs),	  commencing	  with	  the	  International	  AIDS	  Vaccine	  Initiative	  (IAVI)	  in	   1996.	   	   A	   further	   16	   partnerships	   were	   established	   as	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   entities	   by	  philanthropic	   foundations	   and	   official	   donors	   from	   1999	   to	   2003.	   	   PDPs	   are	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   of	   a	   very	   specific	   kind49	   in	   which	   “virtual”	   research	   and	  development	   organisations	   use	   the	  management	   practices,	   methods	   and	   resources	   of	  private	   corporations,	   as	   well	   as	   academic	   expertise,	   to	   develop	   medicines	   or	  technologies	   relevant	   for	   the	   prevention,	   diagnosis	   and	   treatment	   of	   neglected	  diseases50.	   	  Products	  include	  vaccines,	  drugs,	  microbicides,	  diagnostic	  technologies	  and	  vector	   control	   agents.	   	   There	   are	   currently	   upwards	   of	   2051	   health	   research	   and	  development	  PDPs,	  of	  which	  17	  have	  been	  quite	  well	   studied.	   	  The	   four	   largest—IAVI,	  the	  Medicines	   for	  Malaria	  Venture	  (MMV),	   the	  Program	  for	  Appropriate	  Technology	   in	  Health	  (PATH)	  and	  the	  TB	  Alliance—accounted	  for	  just	  over	  half	  of	  the	  $US483	  million52	  donors	  provided	  to	  PDPs	  in	  2010.	  Each	   PDP	   has	   quite	   specific	   characteristics,	   though	   typically	   a	   PDP	   will	   have	   the	  following	  features.	  
− It	   will	   work	   with	   a	   diversified	   portfolio	   of	   candidate	   products,	   with	   regular	  reviews	   of	   progress	   informing	   decisions	   on	   which	   projects	   to	   terminate	   and	  which	  to	  take	  forward	  into	  increasingly	  demanding	  (and	  expensive)	  clinical	  trials,	  leading	  ultimately	  to	  registration	  for	  use	  in	  relevant	  markets.	  	  	  
                                                




− It	  will	   have	   a	   lean	  operating	  model,	  with	   all	   laboratory	  work	   and	   clinical	   trials	  conducted	   by	   other	   parties—academic	   institutions,	   large	   private	   corporations	  and	   small	   biotechnology	   companies,	   in	   both	   developed	   and	   developing	  countries—under	  contract	  or	  agreement.	  	  	  
− It	  will	  require	  private	  sector	  partners	  to	  either	  assign	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  to	   it	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   intended	   use	   of	   a	   product	   under	   development,	   often	   by	  means	   of	   a	   royalty-­‐free	   licence53,	   or	   to	   apply	   preferential	   product	   pricing	   in	  developing	  country	  markets.	  	  	  
− It	   will	   receive	   substantial	   in-­‐kind	   contributions	   from	   industry	   partners	   other	  than	  those	  engaged	  on	  contract.	  	  Industry	  partners	  are	  reluctant	  to	  quantify	  such	  contributions	   but	   they	   are	   very	   substantial54;	   MMV	   (MMV	   2011)	   and	   the	   TB	  Alliance	  (TB	  Alliance	  2011)	  both	  estimate	  the	  value	  of	  the	  in-­‐kind	  contributions	  they	  receive	  to	  be	  around	  1.5	  times	  the	  value	  of	  cash	  contributions	  from	  donors.	  While	  PDPs	  are	  a	  health	  sector	  phenomenon,	   there	  are	  also	  examples	   in	  agriculture	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  with	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  PDPs.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  of	   these	   is	   the	   golden	   rice	   initiative,	   initially	   supported	  by	   the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  and	  subsequently	  by	  governments,	  Syngenta,	  the	  Bill	  and	  Melinda	  Gates	  Foundation	  and	  many	   other	   organisations.	   	   The	   initiative	   aims	   to	   make	   beta-­‐carotene-­‐fortified	   rice	  widely	  available	  to	  poor	  communities	  in	  developing	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  vitamin	  A	  deficiency,	  subject	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  “humanitarian	  use”	  licences.55	  	  	  	  	  
6.1.	  	  Impact	  of	  PDPs	  
The	  advent	  of	  PDPs	  in	  health	  has	  made	  a	  big	  difference.	  	  Twelve	  new	  technologies	  have	  already	  been	  brought	  to	  market	  (TB	  Alliance	  2011)	  and,	  as	  of	  2011,	  there	  were	  a	  further	  143	  candidate	  products	  in	  PDP	  pipelines	  (DNDi	  2011)56.	  	  PDPs	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  new	  global	  health	  products	  registered	  in	  the	  decade	  to	  2010	  (Policy	  Cures	  2012).	  	  An	  annual	  average	  of	  2.6	  new	  products	  was	  approved	  between	  2000	  and	  2009,	  
                                                




compared	   to	   1.8	   between	  1975	   and	  1999.	   	   Around	  one-­‐fifth	   of	   global	   health	   research	  funding	  now	  flows	  to	  and	  through	  PDPs,	  or	  more	  like	  40	  per	  cent	  if	  one	  excludes	  funding	  from	  the	  US	  National	  Institutes	  for	  Health,	  the	  behemoth	  of	  global	  health	  research.	  	  	  Products	  have	  been	  developed	  more	  quickly	  than	  is	  the	  norm	  in	  an	  industry	  where	  10-­‐20	   year	   lead	   times	   are	   not	   unusual,	   and	   more	   cheaply.	   	   Estimates	   suggest	   product	  development	  costs	  have	  generally	  been	  in	  the	  $US120-­‐$200	  million	  range,	  whereas	  the	  cost	  of	  developing	  a	  drug	   is	  normally	   in	   the	  $US600-­‐800	  million	  range	  and	   the	  cost	  of	  developing	   a	   vaccine	   might	   be	   anywhere	   from	   a	   few	   hundred	  million	   dollars	   to	  $US1.5	  billion.	  	  	  Products	   registered	   have	   also	   been	   delivered	   at	   low	   cost:	   	   a	   course	   of	   treatment	   of	  Coartem	   Dispersible	   (see	   Box	   4),	   developed	   by	   MMV	  with	   Novartis,	   costs	   $US0.38;	   a	  dose	   of	   the	   MenAfriVac	   meningitis	   vaccine,	   developed	   for	   Africa’s	   meningitis	   belt	   by	  PATH	  and	  manufactured	  by	  the	  Serum	  Institute	  of	  India,	  will	  cost	  $US0.50.	  
Box	  4:	  	  Medicines	  for	  Malaria	  Venture	  (MMV)—Coartem	  Dispersible	  	  	  MMV	   was	   the	   first	   drug	   development	   PDP.	   	   It	   was	   established	   in	   1999	   to	   discover,	  develop	   and	   deliver	   safe,	   effective	   and	   affordable	   antimalarial	   drugs.	   	   Over	   the	  subsequent	   decade,	   MMV	   and	   its	   partners	   have	   assembled	   the	   largest	   pipeline	   of	  antimalarial	   drugs	   in	   history57	   and	   have	   registered	   several	   products.	   	   One	   of	   these	   is	  Coartem	  Dispersible,	  the	  first	  child-­‐friendly	  formulation	  of	  the	  artemisinin-­‐combination	  therapy	  Coartem,	  developed	  in	  partnership	  with	  Novartis.	  	  	  Malaria	  kills	  approximately	  655,000	  people	  every	  year,	  mostly	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  86	  per	   cent	   of	  whom	  are	   children	  under	   the	   age	  of	   five.	   	   A	   child	  dies	   every	  minute,	  with	  malaria	   accounting	   for	   about	   20	   per	   cent	   of	   pediatric	  mortality	   in	   Africa.	   	   Before	   the	  introduction	   of	   the	   pediatric	   formulation	   of	   Coartem,	   children	   and	   infants	   were	  administered	   with	   the	   bitter-­‐tasting	   adult	   formulation	   in	   ground-­‐up	   form.	   	   Coartem	  Dispersible,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  sweet-­‐tasting	  and	  dissolves	  easily	  in	  small	  amounts	  of	  water,	  easing	  administration	  and	  ensuring	  effective	  dosing.	   	  A	  phase	  3	  study	  published	  in	  The	  
Lancet	   showed	   that	   Coartem	   Dispersible	   provides	   a	   cure	   rate	   of	   97.8	   per	   cent	   for	  
                                                




uncomplicated	   Plasmodium	   falciparum	   malaria,	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   the	   adult	  formulation.	  	  By	  September	  2012,	  over	  140	  million	  treatments	  had	  been	  delivered	  to	  35	  malaria-­‐endemic	  countries,	  accounting	   for	  100	  per	  cent	  of	   total	  Coartem	  deliveries	   for	  patients	   with	   a	   bodyweight	   from	   five	   to	   25	   kilograms.	   	   Novartis	   supplies	   Coartem	  Dispersible	   without	   profit	   to	   the	   public	   sector	   in	   these	   countries,	   as	   it	   does	  with	   the	  adult	  formulation.	  The	   development	   of	   Coartem	   Dispersible	   commenced	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  MMV-­‐Novartis	  partnership	  in	  late-­‐2003	  and	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  formal	  agreement	  in	  2004.	  	  Once	   this	   product	   was	   selected	   as	   the	   lead	   candidate	   in	   2004,	   product	   development	  proceeded	   rapidly	   through	   a	   series	   of	   clinical	   studies	   of	   palatability,	   bioavailability,	  efficacy	  and	  bioequivalence.	   	  The	  product	  gained	  approval	   in	  Switzerland	   in	  2008	  and	  was	  launched	  in	  2009.	   	  Following	  the	  launch,	  MMV	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  supporting	  access	  to	   it	   in	  target	  markets,	   including	  by	  analysing	  barriers	  to	  access	   in	  francophone	  Africa,	   assisting	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   simple	   stock	  management	   systems	   at	   health	  posts	  and	  undertaking	  advocacy	  for	  policy	  change	  at	  the	  national	  level	  in	  line	  with	  WHO	  guidance	   on	   Better	   Medicines	   for	   Children.	   	   In	   addition,	   Novartis	   and	   MMV	   provide	  malaria	   case	   management	   educational	   programs	   which	   include	   hands-­‐on	   training	   for	  local	  healthcare	  workers,	   customised	   training	  manuals,	   and	  user-­‐friendly	  packaging	   to	  improve	  patient	  compliance	  and	  ensure	  that	  Coartem	  Dispersible	  is	  properly	  used.	  Product	  development	  does	  not	  always	  move	  so	  quickly.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  pharmaceutical	  company,	  Novartis,	  already	  had	  strong	  CEO-­‐level	  commitment	   to	   the	  provision	  of	   low-­‐cost	   anti-­‐malarial	   drugs	   to	   developing	   countries,	   a	   global	   footprint	   for	   product	  promotion	   and	   introduction,	   and	   global	   manufacturing	   capacity.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	  scientific	  hurdle	  was	  relatively	  low—this	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  an	  existing	  formulation—and	  the	  acceptance	  hurdle	  was	  also	  quite	  low	  because	  Coartem	  was	  already	  in	  wide	  use	  in	  its	  adult	  formulation.	  
This	   summary	  case	   study	  draws	  on	  a	  presentation	  given	  by	  George	   Jagoe	  of	  MMV	  during	   the	  Development	  
Policy	  Centre’s	  forum,	  “Engaging	  business	  in	  development”,	  on	  17	  October	  2012.	  
6.2.	  	  Support	  for	  PDPs	  




substantial,	   if	   not	   precisely	   quantified,	   resources	   from	   big	   business.	   	   They	   usually	  manage	   a	   portfolio	   of	   projects,	   thus	   spreading	   risk	   (or	   “de-­‐risking	   bets”).	   	   They	  concentrate	  expertise	  in	  a	  way	  that	  no	  individual	  donor	  agency	  could.	  	  They	  also	  allocate	  resources	  competitively	  and	  transparently	  to	  research	  institutions	  in	  both	  the	  developed	  and	  developing	  world,	  thus	  relieving	  donors	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  “picking	  winners”.	  	  Private	  foundations	  particularly	  the	  Bill	  and	  Melinda	  Gates	  Foundation	  have	  provided	  the	  lion’s	  share	   of	   PDP	   funding—60	   per	   cent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   MMV.	   	   It	   might	   be	   considered	  surprising	   that	   relatively	   few	  bilateral	  donors58	  have	  so	   far	  provided	  support	   to	  PDPs.	  	  However,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   reflect	   the	   rapidity	  of	   their	   emergence	  and	  proliferation,	   the	  highly	   technical	   and	   exploratory59	   nature	   of	   their	   work,	   the	   inflexibility	   of	   donor	  resource	  allocation,	   and	  perhaps	  a	  preference	   in	   some	  cases	   to	   restrict	   funding	   to	   the	  donor’s	  national	  research	  institutions.	  It	   is	   less	   easy	   to	   be	   certain	   about	  why	   PDPs	  might	   be	   attractive	   to	   industry	   partners.	  	  One	  reason	   is	  clear:	   	  during	   the	  1990s,	   large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  experienced	  a	  high	   level	  of	  negative	  publicity	  about	   their	  engagement	   in	  developing	  countries,	  either	  because	   they	  were	   seen	   as	   charging	   unconscionable	   prices	   or	   because	   they	  were	   not	  engaged	  at	  all.	  	  Their	  cooperation	  in	  PDPs	  is	  probably	  not	  accurately	  described	  as	  part	  of	  their	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   agenda,	   but	   certainly	   has	   something	   to	   do	   with	  bolstering	  their	  public	  image	  and	  competitive	  edge.	  	  A	  second	  reason	  is	  more	  altruistic,	  if	  also	  more	   fragile:	   	   these	   companies	   contain	   dedicated	   individuals,	   including	   at	   senior	  management	  levels,	  many	  of	  whom	  likely	  entered	  the	  field	  of	  medical	  research	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  	  In	  general,	  employee	  morale	  and	  loyalty	  is	  increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  company’s	  involvement	  in	  public-­‐good	  efforts	  such	  as	  PDPs.	  	  A	  third	   reason,	   cited	   by	   those	  who	   harbor	   suspicions	   about	   the	  worth	   of	   public-­‐private	  partnerships	   in	  health	   research60,	   is	  market	  positioning:	   	   a	   company	  might,	  over	   time,	  attract	  commercial	  benefits	  from	  having	  assumed	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  a	  developing	  
                                                




country	  market	   through	   its	   engagement	   in	  PDPs.	   	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   reasons	  offered	  here	  for	  industry	  participation	  in	  PDPs	  are	  also	  reasons	  for	  companies	  to	  invest	  in	   neglected	   disease	   research	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   PDPs,	   and	   in	   fact	   there	   have	   been	  renewed	  efforts	  in	  this	  area	  by	  the	  major	  pharmaceutical	  companies.61	  There	   are	   indications	   that	   funding	   for	   PDPs	   in	   health	   has	   suffered	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  subsequent	  reductions	  in	  aid	  budgets.	  	  Total	  donor	  funding	  for	  PDPs	  fell	  by	  amounts	  between	  $US30	  million	  and	  $US50	  million	   in	  each	  of	  2009,	  2010	  and	  2011,	  from	  a	  high	  of	  $US580	  million	  in	  2008	  to	  $US451	  million	  in	  2011	  (Moran	  et	  al.	  	  2012).	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   more	   products	   are	   advancing	   to	  more	   costly	   stages	   of	   the	  development	  process.	   	  A	  phase	  3	  clinical	  trial,	   the	   last	  hurdle	  before	  product	  approval,	  can	   involve	   administering	   a	   treatment	   to	   thousands	   of	   people	   in	   developing	   country	  environments.	   	   The	   current	   shortfall	   in	   donor	   funding	   against	   estimated	   health	   PDP	  financing	   needs	   is	   not	   known	  with	   any	   precision,	   but	   in	   2004	   it	  was	   estimated	   to	   be	  somewhere	  between	  $US1.2	  billion	   and	  $US2.2	  billion	   (Widdus	   and	  White	  2004,	   p.	   2).	  	  In	   its	  most	   recent	  business	  plan	   (2012-­‐16),	  MMV	  estimated	  a	   five-­‐year	   funding	  gap	  of	  $US61	  million.	  	  However,	  MMV	  has	  been	  an	  outstandingly	  successful	  fund-­‐raiser	  and	  this	  estimate	  is	  based	  on	  the	  quite	  demanding	  assumption	  that	  current	  donors	  continue	  their	  support	  at	  current	  levels,	  and	  that	  annual	  operating	  costs	  can	  be	  reduced	  by	  15-­‐20	  per	  cent	  each	  year	  to	  2016.	  	  	  
6.3.	  	  Review	  and	  evaluation	  
It	  appears	  there	  have	  been	  few	  rigorous	  external	  evaluations	  of	  PDPs	  to	  date,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   IAVI	  and	  MMV62,	   though	  there	  have	  been	  many	   informal	  assessments,	   for	  example,	   by	   the	   philanthropic	   investment	   advisory	   organisation,	   Fastercures,	   and	   by	  academic	  commentators.	  	  	  A	  2007	   review	  of	  MMV	  by	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   Independent	  Evaluation	  Group	   (IEG)	   is	   a	  particularly	   clear	   and	   useful	   appraisal,	   and	  many	   of	   its	   findings	   are	   likely	   to	   apply	   to	  other	  PDPs.	   	  Building	  on	  an	  earlier	   independent	  evaluation	  (Fairlamb	  et	  al.	   	  2005),	  the	  
                                                




review	   found	   that	   MMV	   had	   made	   “tremendous	   progress”	   and	   had	   well	   exceeded	  expectations.	  	  It	  concluded	  that	  MMV	  was	  an	  effective,	  well-­‐managed	  mechanism	  and	  an	  efficient	  allocator	  of	  public	  and	  private	  resources	  to	  finance	  potential	  new	  malaria	  drugs.	  	  The	  size	  of	  its	  portfolio,	  and	  its	  active	  management	  of	  this,	  was	  found	  to	  have	  delivered	  substantial	   efficiencies.	   	   Questions	   were	   raised	   about	   the	   comparative	   advantage	   of	  MMV	  in	  delivering	  on	  its	  “access”	  agenda—MMV,	  like	  some	  other	  PDPs,	  has	  extended	  its	  mandate	   beyond	   product	   discovery,	   development	   and	   registration	   (all	   global	   public	  goods)	  to	  encompass	  limited	  measures	  aimed	  at	  improving	  the	  availability	  and	  uptake	  of	  products.63	   	   Further	   questions	  were	   raised	   about	   the	   proliferation	   of	   PDPs	   generally,	  which	   IEG	   suggested	   called	   for	   better	   coordination	   and	   perhaps	   a	   new	   overarching	  structure	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   Consultative	   Group	   on	   International	   Agricultural	  Research.64	  	  	  Other	  assessments	  of	  PDPs	  have	  generally	  been	  provided	   in	  an	  advocacy	  context	  or	  at	  least	   by	   interested	   parties.	   	   For	   example,	   MMV	   and	   associated	   parties	   made	   a	  submission	   in	  2010	   to	  Australia’s	   Independent	  Review	  of	  Aid	  Effectiveness,	   as	  did	   the	  TB	   Alliance,	   outlining	   the	   benefits	   of	   PDPs	   and	   urging	   the	   Australian	   government	   to	  support	  PDPs	  generally	  and	  their	  own	  in	  particular.	  	  The	  submission,	  perhaps	  assuming	  a	  multilateral	   contribution	  was	  unlikely,	   proposed	   that	   the	  Australian	  National	  Health	  and	  Medical	  Research	  Council	   (NHMRC)	  “oversee”	   financial	  support	   for	  PDPs	   from	  the	  Australian	  aid	  program,	  specifically	  to	  support	  the	  conduct	  of	  clinical	  trials	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Papua	  New	  Guinea.	  	  In	  briefings	  for	  Australian	  parliamentarians,	  representatives	  of	  the	  Drugs	  for	  Neglected	  Diseases	  Initiative	  (DNDi)	  have	  stressed	  the	  benefits	  of	  PDPs	  for	  developing	  countries	  and	  for	  Australian	  research	  bodies,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  already	  heavily	  engaged	  with	  PDPs65.	  	  	  It	  appears	   that	   the	  above	  advocacy	  efforts	  have	  borne	  modest	   fruit:	   	  AusAID’s	  medical	  research	   strategy,	   released	   in	   late	   October	   2012,	   includes	   a	   commitment	   to	   support	  PDPs,	  with	  an	   initial	   focus	  on	  malaria	  and	   tuberculosis.	   	  However,	   the	   level	  of	   funding	  
                                                




provided	  will	   be	   quite	   limited:	   	   annual	   funding	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	   $A10	  million	  will	   be	  divided	  between	  multiple	  PDPs	  and	  a	  planned	  partnership	  with	  the	  NHMRC	  to	  support	  Australian	  medical	  research	  for	  development.	   	  Assuming	  an	  annual	  contribution	  of	  say	  $A5	  million	  to	  PDPs,	  Australia	  would	  be	  contributing	  around	  one	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  donor	  funding	  to	  PDPs,	  which	  is	  about	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  its	  share	  of	  global	  aid,	  or	  one-­‐half	  of	  its	  typical	  share	  in	  multilateral	  funds.	  
6.4.	  	  Key	  issues	  for	  consideration	  








quantities	   to	   certain	   countries,	   as	   in	   fact	   has	   happened	   through	   the	   Affordable	  Medicines	   Facility—malaria	   (AMFm).	   	   PDPs,	   as	   just	   noted,	   do	   take	   some	  measures	   to	   promote	   availability	   and	   uptake,	   but	   they	   are	   fundamentally	  research	  and	  development	  bodies.	  	  PDPs	  need	  to	  consider	  carefully	  how	  far	  they	  proceed	   along	   the	   path	   of	   promoting	   access	   and	   delivery,	   whether	   through	  market-­‐based	   or	   public	   sector	   approaches,	   before	   passing	   the	   baton	   to	   other	  organisations.	   	   Clearly	   they	   should	   not	   seek	   to	   run	   complex,	   market-­‐based	  incentive	   schemes,	   as	   this	   would	   fall	   well	   outside	   their	   mandates	   and	  competence.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   donors	   will	   need	   to	   make	   resource	   allocation	  decisions	  holistically	  to	  ensure	  an	  adequate	  and	  balanced	  provision	  for	  research	  and	  development	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  access	  and	  delivery	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  5. Evaluation	  and	  review.	   	  The	  sustainability	  of	   the	  PDP	  model	   is	  not	  certain.	   	   It	   is	  not	  possible	  to	  be	  sure	  of	  continued,	  significant	  industry	  participation	  in	  PDPs.	  	  In	  addition,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  much	   of	   the	   low-­‐hanging	   fruit	   has	   been	   harvested,	  such	  that	  future	  projects	  will	  increasingly	  be	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  available	  donor	  funding.	   	   These	   uncertainties	   suggest	   the	   need	   for	   better	   evaluation	   of	   the	  progress	  and	  achievements	  of	  PDPs	  to	  date,	  based	  on	  performance	  metrics	   that	  permit	  comparison	  between	  them.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  time	  is	  right	  for	  an	  overarching	  review	  of	  PDPs,	  covering:	  	  	  
− their	  progress	  and	  achievements,	  	  
− resource	  requirements,	  	  
− the	  outlook	  for	  industry	  participation,	  	  
− governance,	  resource	  mobilisation	  and	  resource	  allocation	  at	  the	  “system”	  level,	  and	  	  




global	  aid	  levels	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  decline,	  for	  the	  relevant	  donors	  to	  take	  a	  more	  holistic	  and	   strategic	   view	   of	   the	   multiple	   and	   competing	   mechanisms	   that	   now	   exist	   for	  engaging	   the	   private	   sector	   in	   the	   discovery,	   development	   and	   delivery	   of	   medicines	  essential	  for	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  	  
7.	  	  Conclusion	  




organically.	  	  They	  now	  look	  ripe	  for	  better	  coordination,	  more	  transparency	  and	  greater	  evaluative	   rigour.	   	   Development	   agencies	   like	   AusAID	   that	   want	   to	   increase	   their	  engagement	  with	  business	  would	  do	  well	  to	  support	  comprehensive	  evaluations	  of	  past	  efforts	   and	   to	   build	   more	   rigorous	   evaluation	   arrangements—though	   not	   unduly	  heavy—into	  new	  partnerships.	  	  	  	  Second,	   we	   have	   repeatedly	   encountered	   the	   view	   that	   relationships	   between	  development	  agencies	  and	  private	  sector	  actors	  need	  to	  be	  mediated	  by	  “brokers”	  who	  understand	   the	   imperatives	   and	   operating	   methods	   of	   both	   parties	   and	   can	   provide	  them	  with	  advice	  and	  support	  as	  necessary.	   	  This	   is	  a	  persuasive	  suggestion,	  on	  which	  there	   has	   been	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   little	   action	   to	   date,	   but	   some	   qualifications	   are	  needed.	   	   Given	   the	   range	   and	   complexity	   of	   possible	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   for	  development,	   it	   is	   quite	   unlikely	   that	   a	   single	   “hub”	   could	   effectively	   provide	   such	  brokerage	   services.	   	   More	   likely,	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   look	   to	   different	   service	  providers	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   inclusive	   business66	   and	   service	   delivery,	   and	   possibly	   also	  research	   and	  development	   (not	   limited	   to	  health).	   	   Service	  delivery	   appears	   to	   be	   the	  area	  meriting	   highest	   priority.	   	   The	   understandable	   temptation	   to	   have	   such	   brokers	  recover	   their	   costs	   from	   the	   private	   sector	   should	   be	   met	   with	   caution.	   	   There	   is	  certainly	  a	  case	   for	  seeking	  private	  sector	  contributions,	  but	   these	  should	  probably	  be	  kept	  small	  relative	  to	  funding	  from	  development	  agencies,	  or	  else	  brokers	  are	  liable	  to	  become	  extensions	  of	  firms’	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  units.	  	  	  Third,	   some	   of	   the	   thorniest	   issues	   that	   arise	   in	   connection	   with	   public-­‐private	  partnerships	   for	   development	   relate	   to	   agent	   selection.	   	   	   	   The	   provision	   of	   public	  subsidies	   to	  a	  selected	  private	  sector	  actor	  always	  carries	   the	  risk	   that	  other	  actors	   in	  the	  same	  market	  will	  be	  disadvantaged	  in	  some	  important	  way.	  	  This	  is	  not	  just	  a	  matter	  of	   fairness,	   which	   can	   be	   at	   least	   partially	   assured	   through	   competitive,	   transparent	  resource	   allocation	   processes.	   	   The	   risk	   is	   that	   privileging	   one	   actor	   will	   have	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects,	   for	   example	   by	   allowing	   them	   space	   to	   erect	   effective	   barriers	   to	  market	  entry	  for	  other	  prospective	  players.	  	  One	  solution	  is	  to	  explore,	  where	  possible,	  the	   use	   of	   approaches	   that	   tie	   payments	   to	   results,	   regardless	   of	   who	   delivers	   those	  results,	   rather	   than	   tying	   payments	   to	   proposals	   from	   specific	   proponents.	   	   As	   noted	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